{"id":6646,"date":"2025-03-01T14:10:16","date_gmt":"2025-03-01T13:10:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/?p=6646"},"modified":"2025-03-02T11:46:13","modified_gmt":"2025-03-02T10:46:13","slug":"13-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/abstracts\/13-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"13\/2025"},"content":{"rendered":"

Volodymyr Ratnikov<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Vinnytsia National Technical University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: sozon1948@ukr.net<\/span><\/p>\n

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE AND THE PLACE OF CHAOS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.2<\/span><\/p>\n

ABSTRACT <\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

This article examines the main ideas of the metaphysics of the prominent American logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. It is shown that a significant part of his “scientific metaphysics” is evolutionary cosmology, characterized, in particular, by the essential role of randomness in the world. Among the innovative ideas of evolutionary cosmology, the idea of the chaotic beginning of the Universe and constructive understanding of randomness stands out. The paper shows that this idea echoes some modern problems of quantum-relativistic cosmology, and first of all, the problems of the still popular “inflationary model,” in which the idea of the chaotic beginning of the evolution of the Universe is one of the central ones<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords: <\/strong>metaphysics, determinism, randomness, chaos, cosmology<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Giorgio Derossi<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

University of Palermo and the University of Trieste<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: cattaruzzaserena@gmail.com<\/span><\/p>\n

THE PHENOMENOSCOPIC ANALYSIS OF THE INTRAVISIBLE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.3<\/span><\/p>\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cPhenomenoscopic analysis\u201d differs from the phenomenological analysis of the vision of the essence of phenomena highlighted, with an appropriate intentional act, as pure object; phenomenoscopic analysis instead regards this vision as organically linked to the phenomenal appearing of the physical meaning inherent in the experimental datum identified and expressed mathematically; therefore, said vision is not pure but rather integrated <\/i>with \u201cvisivation,\u201d i.e. the highlighting <\/i>of the factor, also phenomenal, which constitutes the necessary condition for its actual appearing. This factor is not immediately visible because it transpires from within <\/i>the datum perceived on the surface. It is only \u201cintravisible\u201d and therefore must be shown by means of a particular thought experiment: one suitably reintegrated with its inalienable visual-perceptual component and thus qualified\u2014more so than the kind generally employed in philosophical and scientific demonstrations\u2014to make visible the crucial factor otherwise unseen or merely glimpsed. For this reason, said factor is not taken into account in the intuitive <\/i>and not strictly perceptual <\/i>visualisation of the physical meaning<\/i>, which thus remains devoid of that phenomenal visibility which makes the indispensable empirical verification possible (according to Wittgenstein\u2019s words: \u201cThe inexpressible certainly exists. It shows itself\u201d). As a proof of the validity of this different methodological and epistemological approach, here we present a phenomenoscopic analysis of the mental experiments\u2014singularly alike in this regard\u2014 developed, on the one hand, by zeno of elea in the kinematic paradox of Achilles and, on the other hand, by Einstein in his Special Theory of Relativity demonstrations<\/i>. The phenomenoscopic analysis of the intravisible, therefore, highlights the fact that the discovery of the essence of phenomenal reality requires not the separation but, on the contrary, the mutual integration of the scientific point of view and the philosophical one, both necessary, while maintaining their respective functions distinct. Indeed, it is first and foremost the mathematical recognition of the real datum that enables logical deduction to pose the ensuing theoretical problem in the correct terms; the demonstration that it is in line with the real data and with the objective solution to the actual problems is up to their \u201cvisivation,\u201d which allows one to glimpse their phenomenal essence and the metaphysical meaning inherent in the physical one. Ultimately, it follows that the objectivity of scientific and philosophical knowledge is not founded on unilateral \u201cphenomenological evidence\u201d, which is inevitably subjective (as Jan \u0141ukasiewicz acutely observed and highlighted in contrast to Edmund Husserl), but rather on a homogeneous, integrated synergy between science and philosophy which preserves their distinct but correlated functions<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords: <\/strong>Phenomenoscopic analysis, appearing, demonstration, mental experiment intravisible, observation, physico-phenomenal meaning, visivation<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Maciej Raz\u0301niak<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Szko\u0142a Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, ul. Dobra 56\/66, pok. 0.108, 00-312 Warszawa<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: m.razniak@student.uw.edu.pl<\/span><\/p>\n

KOINCYDENSY<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.4<\/span><\/p>\n

STRESZCZENIE<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Moz\u0307na wyro\u0301z\u0307nic\u0301 przynajmniej dwa znaczenia terminu \u201ekoincydens\u201d, mianowicie: <\/span><\/span>we\u0328z\u0307sze <\/i><\/span>\u2014 zaproponowane przez Zdzis\u0142awa Augustynka i wprowadzone sztucznie do s\u0142ownika ontologii czasoprzestrzeni \u2014 oraz takie, kto\u0301remu mimo braku wyraz\u0301nego zdefiniowania w fizyce odpowiadaja\u0328 przedmioty punktowe; te koincydensy nazywamy <\/span><\/span>adekwatnymi<\/i>. W niniejszym artykule (1) rekonstruujemy definicje\u0328 wa\u0328skich koincydenso\u0301w oraz (2) omawiamy ich poszczego\u0301lne rodzaje. W dalszej kolejnos\u0301ci (3) wskazujemy na problemy generowane przez zbyt wa\u0328skie rozumienie terminu \u201ekoincydens\u201d oraz podejmujemy pro\u0301be\u0328 rozszerzenia poje\u0328cia koincydensu tak, aby jego legitymacja bra\u0142a sie\u0328 juz\u0307 nie z metafizyki, ale z fizyki. Wreszcie (4) rozwaz\u0307amy status koincydenso\u0301w, zaro\u0301wno we\u0328z\u0307szych, jak i adekwatnych, w wybranych ontologiach nieewentystycznych<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

S\u0142owa kluczowe: <\/strong>filozofia fizyki, czasoprzestrzen\u0301, ewentyzm punktowy, teoria wzgle\u0328dnos\u0301ci, reizm, ontologia.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Toma\u0301s\u030c C\u030cana<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: tomas.cana73@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

THE DIFFERENT ROLES OF DEDUCTION IN COMMUNICATION<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.5<\/span><\/p>\n

ABSTRACT <\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

This article is concerned with a distinction between two epistemic roles that, according to Michael Dummett, deductively valid arguments could play in communication. This means the distinction between: a) arguments that purport to explain, and b) arguments that purport to persuade. The article is also concerned with a resulting shift in the appropriate approach to these roles of arguments. In this respect, for example, an idea emerges which traditionally any realistic-minded author would have automatically dismissed as unthinkable, but which is now relevant. This is the idea of circular justification of knowledge as something rationally acceptable<\/i>. The distinction also leads us to the view that we do not need anyone to convince us that the rules of correct deduction are valid. In fact, we are already convinced of the validity of the forms of inference that guide us at the moment we think about the deductively valid arguments. There should consequently be no authentic context in which we need to be persuaded of their validity. The present article attempts to reflect critically on the distinction between the epistemic roles of arguments, and on the resulting shift in the methodology, by making four critical objections to its presentation<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords: <\/strong>Argumentation, communication, deduction, Michael Dummett, explanation, knowledge, logical necessity, persuasion, proof, validity<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Mariusz Mazurek<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy S\u0301wiat 72, 00-330 Warsaw<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: mariusz.mazurek@ifispan.edu.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

LIMITATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. WHY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CANNOT REPLACE THE HUMAN MIND<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.6<\/span><\/p>\n

ABSTRACT <\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

This paper examines the historical and contemporary challenges in the development of artificial intelligence. Replicating the human mind\u2014with its intentionality, self-awareness, and creativity\u2014has been, from its inception, a major challenge in artificial intelligence (AI) research. A fundamental issue remains the inability of AI systems to address \u201cwhy?\u201d and \u201cfor what purpose?\u201d questions, underscoring the distinction between machines and humans in terms of meaning-making and contextual interpretation.<\/span><\/p>\n

Contemporary technologies, such as neural networks and deep learning, aim to emulate cognitive mechanisms observed in biological systems. Nonetheless, limitations such as the \u201cframe problem\u201d and the inability to simulate intentional states persist as significant barriers in the development of these systems. These challenges have prompted an interdisciplinary approach, integrating engineering, philosophy, psychology, and biology, and have led to the emergence of the concept of \u201cnaturalness\u201d in AI design. This concept emphasizes mimicking not only cognitive functions but also the adaptive and goal-directed processes characteristic of the human mind<\/span>s<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords: <\/strong>Artificial intelligence, intentionality, AI limitations, human vs. machine thinking<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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S\u0142awomir Czetwertyn\u0301ski, Jakub Marcinkowski<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

S\u0142awomir Czetwertyn\u0301ski \u2014 Katedra Mikroekonomii i Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroc\u0142awiu, ul. Komandorska 118\/120, Wroc\u0142aw.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: slawomir.czetwertynski@ue.wroc.pl<\/span><\/p>\n

Jakub Marcinkowski \u2014 Katedra Zarza\u0328dzania Strategicznego i Logistyki, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroc\u0142awiu, ul. Komandorska 118\/120, Wroc\u0142aw.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: jakub.marcinkowski@ue.wroc.pl<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

O INTELIGENCJI KOLEKTYWNEJ W PROCESIE IDEALIZACJI W UJE\u0328CIU EKONOMII I ZARZA\u0328DZANIA<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.7<\/span><\/p>\n

STRESZCZENIE<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Tematyka niniejszego artyku\u0142u wpisuje sie\u0328 w debate\u0328 nad moz\u0307liwos\u0301ciami poznawczymi w naukach spo\u0142ecznych, ze szczego\u0301lnym uwzgle\u0328dnieniem zastosowania elemento\u0301w metod eksperckich w metodach izolacji. Konkretnie skupiono sie\u0328 na metodzie delfickiej oraz metodzie idealizacji i stopniowej konkretyzacji. Za cel artyku\u0142u przyje\u0328to pro\u0301be\u0328 udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie badawcze g\u0142osza\u0328ce: czy zastosowanie metody delfickiej pozwoli na sformu\u0142owanie sk\u0142adowych perspektywy ontologicznej, kto\u0301ra\u0328 moz\u0307na wykorzystac\u0301 w procesie idealizacji zjawisk z obszaru ekonomii i zarza\u0328dzania? Realizacja tak postawionego celu ma ukazac\u0301, jak moz\u0307na zasta\u0328pic\u0301, w\u0142as\u0301ciwy dla metody idealizacji, mechanizm wy\u0142aniania czynnika naczelnego oparty na dowodzeniu logiczno-abstrakcyjnym (wnioskowaniu niezawodnym), mechanizmem opartym na idei inteligencji kolektywnej (wnioskowaniu <\/span>nie <\/i>niezawodnym)<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

S\u0142owa kluczowe: <\/strong>metoda idealizacji, metoda izolacji, metoda delficka, inteligencja kolektywna, metodologia nauk ekonomicznych, metodologia nauk o zarza\u0328dzaniu.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Anna Martin<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: michalskanna@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

SHARED AGENCY IN COMPLEX SETTINGS<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.8<\/span><\/p>\n

ABSTRACT <\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper begins by identifying two opposing approaches to (shared) agency \u2014 the standard model and the dynamical model. Despite differences between them, both models essentially converge upon the belief that shared agency entails direct mutual influence between agents, in the form of either mutual control or mutual responsiveness, respectively. This assumption becomes problematic when applied to interdisciplinary practices, like interdisciplinary research, which involve role specialization and thus do not lend themselves to an explanation in terms of direct mutual influence. In response to this difficulty, the paper advances a third approach \u2014 referred to here as the regulatory model (e.g., Schore, 2000)\u2014which explains shared agency in terms of loose coupling (Gruber, Bo\u0308deker, 2005) understood as a pattern of cyclical organization of action in the course of which different positions (perspectives, agendas) are first differentiated during the exploratory phase and then integrated, giving rise to a dialogical from of self-organization<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords: <\/strong>Agency, shared agency, self-organization, differentiation, unification, interdisciplinary research, integration of perspectiveS<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Bogna Kosmulska<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Wydzia\u0142 Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: bkosmulska@uw.edu.pl <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

DAWNIEJSZE DOMNIEMANE S\u0301WIADECTWA O AUTYZMIE Z PERSPEKTYWY HISTORYCZNEJ I HISTORYCZNOFILOZOFICZNEJ<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.9<\/span><\/p>\n

STRESZCZENIE<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Istnieje pewna liczba s\u0301wiadectw historycznych, kto\u0301re moz\u0307na retrospektywnie, a wie\u0328c z duz\u0307a\u0328 doza\u0328 niepewnos\u0301ci, uznac\u0301 za mo\u0301wia\u0328ce o osobach w spektrum autyzmu. Sa\u0328 takz\u0307e takie s\u0301wiadectwa, kto\u0301re moga\u0328 byc\u0301 pewnym t\u0142em dla wytworzenia sie\u0328 jednostki diagnostycznej autyzmu w latach 40. XX wieku. Artyku\u0142 ma na celu nadanie wybranym dawniejszym z nich (Herodota, Salimbenego de Adama z Parmy, s\u0301w. Augustyna, Marcina Lutra) kontekstu historycznego i, szczego\u0301lnie, historycznofilozoficznego. Oryginalnym wk\u0142adem badawczym artyku\u0142u jest zw\u0142aszcza pro\u0301ba w\u0142a\u0328czenia s\u0301wiadectwa Augustyna z jego I ks.<\/span>Wyznan\u0301 <\/i>(w zestawieniu z innymi dzie\u0142ami mys\u0301liciela) do listy opisywanych juz\u0307 w literaturze przedmiotu. Kontekstualizacji podlega ro\u0301wniez\u0307 kategoria \u201ekontaktu afektywnego\u201d stworzona przez Leo Kannera, wspo\u0301\u0142two\u0301rcy jednostki diagnostycznej autyzmu jako przeciwwagi dla dawniejszych, moralnie nacechowanych uje\u0328c\u0301 historycznych. Wnioski z tych kilkutorowych analiz sa\u0328 dwojakiego rodzaju: po pierwsze, jakie ogo\u0301lne rodzaje z\u0301ro\u0301de\u0142 poznania, biora\u0328c pod uwage\u0328 sama\u0328 nature\u0328 autyzmu (tak jak zosta\u0142a ona pierwotnie zdefiniowana w psychiatrii dziecie\u0328cej), sa\u0328 moz\u0307liwe i etycznie uzasadnione w jego badaniu oraz, po drugie, czego wspo\u0301\u0142czes\u0301nie moz\u0307na sie\u0328 w sensie praktycznym nauczyc\u0301 (i oduczac\u0301), studiuja\u0328c oczyma historyka filozofii dawniejsze domniemane doniesienia o zaburzeniach neurorozwojowych<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

S\u0142owa kluczowe: <\/strong>historia autyzmu, historia filozofii a autyzm, eksperymenty deprywacyjne, kontakt afektywny, niemo\u0301wienie w autyzmie, neuroro\u0301z\u0307norodnos\u0301c\u0301, Herodot, Salimbene de Adam z Parmy, Augustyn z Hippony, Marcin Luter, Leo Kanner.<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/span><\/p>\n

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Ma\u0142gorzata Czarnocka<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, ul. Nowy S\u0301wiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Email: malgorzata.czarnocka@ifispan.edu.pl<\/span><\/p>\n

PRZYCZYNEK DO KRYTYKI RACJONALNOS\u0301CI INSTRUMENTALNEJ \u2014 PROBLEM CELU I S\u0301RODKA PROWADZA\u0328CEGO DO CELU ORAZ ICH WARTOS\u0301CIOWANIA<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.10<\/span><\/p>\n

STRESZCZENIE<\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Przedmiotem rozwaz\u0307an\u0301 jest obecnie powszechnie aprobowana jako standardowa i niebudza\u0328ca wa\u0328tpliwos\u0301ci (np. w eseju <\/span>Instrumental Rationality <\/i>w pretenduja\u0328cej do opiniotwo\u0301rczej <\/span>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/i>) koncepcja racjonalnos\u0301ci instrumentalnej oparta na opisowo-normatywnej definicji: \u201ewybiera sie\u0328\/nalez\u0307y wybierac\u0301 te s\u0301rodki, kto\u0301re sa\u0328 efektywne dla danego celu.\u201d Analizuje\u0328, jakie k\u0142opoty wia\u0328z\u0307a\u0328 sie\u0328 z postulowaniem w tej koncepcji racjonalnos\u0301ci celu dzia\u0142ania jako znanego <\/span>ex ante<\/i>, tj. w fazie planowania dzia\u0142ania, i o niewyznaczonych wartos\u0301ciach, oraz postulowania s\u0301rodko\u0301w, na kto\u0301re nie sa\u0328 na\u0142oz\u0307one z\u0307adne wartos\u0301ci poza efektywnos\u0301cia\u0328 dzia\u0142ania. Wskazuje\u0328 ponadto ro\u0301z\u0307nice pomie\u0328dzy obecnie paradygmatyczna\u0328 koncepcja\u0328 racjonalnos\u0301ci instrumentalnej a bardziej wnikliwa\u0328 koncepcja\u0328 Maxa Webera co do kwestii charakteru celu, s\u0301rodko\u0301w i ich wartos\u0301ci<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

S\u0142owa kluczowe: <\/strong>Racjonalnos\u0301c\u0301 instrumentalna, cel dzia\u0142ania, s\u0301rodek dzia\u0142ania, wartos\u0301ci.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Volodymyr Ratnikov Vinnytsia National Technical University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine. Email: sozon1948@ukr.net CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE AND THE PLACE OF CHAOS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER https:\/\/doi.org\/10.37240\/FiN.2025.13.1.2 ABSTRACT This article examines the main ideas of the metaphysics of the prominent American logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. It is shown that a significant part of his “scientific metaphysics” […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6646","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-abstracts"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6646","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6646"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6646\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6661,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6646\/revisions\/6661"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6646"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6646"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6646"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}