{"id":933,"date":"2015-05-10T08:50:23","date_gmt":"2015-05-10T06:50:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/?p=933"},"modified":"2023-02-11T17:41:49","modified_gmt":"2023-02-11T16:41:49","slug":"22014","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/abstracts\/22014\/","title":{"rendered":"2\/2014"},"content":{"rendered":"

Zdzis\u0142awa Pi\u0105tek\u00a0<\/strong>\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Krak\u00f3w, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krak\u00f3w, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: zdzislawa.piatek33@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

PECULIARITY OF CULTURAL ADAPTATION. THE INSTANCE OF FUNCTIONING OF GENDER STEREOTYPES<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The peculiar character of cultural adaptation in relation to biological adaptation consists in the fact that when the former adaptation has arisen the survival of the human species depends not only on the transmission of genes, but also on memes, i.e. the cultural replicators and their success in the anthroposphere. This paper claims that the adaptative value of cultural reality is ambivalent, because culture contains both true and false beliefs (memes) about both the dimensions of human environment. This is caused by the fact that the mechanisms of cultural adaptation on the level of memes are to some extent independent from the adaptation on the level of genes and may have a negative effect on that level. The way in which memes may influence genes has been presented through the relationship between metaphysics and gender stereotypes.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0cultural adaptation, biological adaptation, anthroposphere, cultural replicators (mem).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Robert Pi\u0142at<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszy\u0144ski University, W\u00f3ycickiego 1\/2, 01\u2013938 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: r.pilat@uksw.edu.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

PHILOSOPHY AND THE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In this report, devoted to the relation between the humanities (especially philosophy) and technical high schools, I analyse the paradox emerging when four claims are accepted: (1) technical high schools demonstrate more and more clearly university aspirations and get properties of the university; (2) the humanities and social sciences are an inherent part of the classical university; (3) in all the world a deep crisis of the classical university occurs; also the social legitimization of the life disinterestingly concentrated on knowledge disappears; (4) the technical mentality and the technical civilization are responsible for this crisis. It is easily seen that the last claim is contradictory to the first one. I try to indicate the sources of this paradox by demonstrating the falsity of claim (4). In conclusion, I maintain a real nihilistic tendency present in the attitude of modern societies toward knowledge.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0technical high school, university, philosophy, technical civilization.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Maciej Soin<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy \u015awiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: msoin@poczta.onet.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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ON POSIBLE WAYS OF TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper attempts to respond to the postulates included in the National Frameworks of Qualifications. Those require syllabuses in higher education be shaped\u00a0 by\u00a0 \u201cabilities of autonomous and responsible actions\u201d. The Author considers the usefulness of various fields of teaching of philosophy for this goal, and he concludes that the greatest prospects for its attaining lie in the teaching of critical thinking in the version based on Wittgenstein\u2019s philosophical investigations. The syllabuses of such teaching are not being reduced to the logical analysis of argumentation, but embrace among others problems of polysemousness of concepts and the verbal disputes emerging when differences between various ways of language use are neglected.\u00a0 The teaching of critical thinking at an advanced level can be engaged in the problem of truth:\u00a0 the diversification of criteria of truthfulness, abilities of differentiating empirical and grammatical statements, and the comparative role of samples in research practices in various domains of science.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0teaching of philosophy, critical thinking, Wittgenstein.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Zbigniew Kr\u00f3l<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: zbigkrol@wp.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

PHILOSOPHY AND EXACT SCIENCES<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In the paper the non-separable union of philosophy and science is demonstrated; it is argued that philosophy is a necessary element of scientific practice. The author presents some arguments for the inalienable presence and need of philosophy in science whose aspirations \u2013 as he maintains \u2013 are not being reduced to the realization of utilitarian needs. The necessity of philosophy originates from the human pursuit of the understanding of reality; this understanding also is the main task of science.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0science, philosophy, utilitarian needs, the understanding of reality.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Grzegorz Pyszczek<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The Maria Grzegorzewska Academy of Special Education, Szcz\u0119\u015bliwicka 40, 02-353 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: pyszczek@poczta.onet.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

THE PHILOSOPHER IN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITIES<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper concerns the problems of the teaching of philosophy in technical universities. Stereotypes and prejudices concerning technology (technophilia, technophobia) is the first\u00a0barrier in this enterprise. The second barrier is caused by the lack of philosophy of technology in philosophical courses, and the third one is brought on by the absence of meta-technical reflection in technical subjects.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:\u00a0<\/strong>technical university, teaching of philosophy, technophilia, technophobia, philosophy of technology.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Marek Maciejczak<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Warsaw University of Technology, Plac Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: marmaciejczak@poczta.onet.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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KNOWING HIMSELF AS A CONDITION OF SUBJECT\u2019S IDENTITY<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Sociological investigations show the ever changing meaning of concepts of individual, identity, obligation towards self and others, and also culture, university, religion.\u00a0\u00a0 In consumerist societies these concepts become fluid. Not only the project of a life style becomes market-oriented, but also that of self-fulfilment. The personal identity requires attention, goals, values, a language. Personal identity requires reflection. Kant, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Wojty\u0142a and Taylor provide guidelines as how to examine this kind of reflection.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0reflection, self-determination, a personal identity, consumerist society, conscious, art, university, religion.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

***<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Pawe\u0142 Bytniewski<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Sk\u0142odowska University, Marii Curie-Sk\u0142odowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: pbytniewski@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCES, THAT IS, EPISTEMOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES OF HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC COGNITION<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper takes as the basis of the considerations the phenomenon of the self-isolation of intellectual cultures of philosophy of science; those cultures are closed in individual traditions, consider pre-restricted issues, ignore achievements of other cultures and research environments. This fact cannot be satisfactorily explained by linguistic differences and separate communicative channels used by social groups of scientists. The paper presents and confronts with each other, in a synoptic system, two traditions: Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science and French philosophy of sciences. Two essential differences between them are emphasized. The first one is the difference between the pluralistic and disciplinary grasps of science in philosophy of sciences and the monism of philosophy of science in treating such problems as rationality of science(s), roles of particular scientific fields in forming philosophical models of the science(s) change; the significance of history of science(s) for epistemological solutions, the grasp of the hierarchy of cognitive values, conceiving the object of history of science(s). The second difference lies in the distinctness of the relation between philosophy and history of science(s) assumed by philosophy of science and philosophy of sciences.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science, French philosophy of science, history of sciences, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault, rationality of science, epistemological non-continuity, archeology of knowledge.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Stanis\u0142aw Czerniak<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy \u015awiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: czerniak.stanislaw@wp.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

GERNOT B\u00d6HME\u2019S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNICS<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The article reconstructs the main threads of Gernot B\u00f6hme\u2019s philosophy of technology. In his writings on the subject in the volume Invasive Technification: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Technology (2008) B\u00f6hme abandons his earlier \u201cfinalisation of science\u201d theory (which the author expounds in detail in the first part of the article) and situates philosophy of technology between philosophical anthropology and social philosophy. In this context, he reflects on the effects of technification for the identity of contemporary humans and changing social integration models (the social role of IT networks and technostructures). B\u00f6hme\u2019s position is par excellence critical. Referring to the philosophical traditions of the Frankfurt School, he argues against the social philosophy of J\u00fcrgen Habermas and asks about the criteria which determine the \u201crationality\u201d of technology. B\u00f6hme also reviews the cultural sources of resistance to \u201cinvasive technification\u201d, not only in Western, but also in Far Eastern cultures. Finally, he discusses those anthropological horizons of technological progress which he considers to be ethically neutral and capable of opening new areas of self-knowledge and expression to humankind. The author closes his paper with a set of questions which in his opinion point to some still open issues in B\u00f6hme\u2019s philosophy of technology.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0philosophy of science models, philosophy of technology, technification, philosophical anthropology, critical theory, rationality of technology, cultural brakes on technification, dialectic of technification.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Ma\u0142gorzata Czarnocka<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy \u015awiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: mczarnoc@ifispan.waw.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

SUBJECTIVITY BY KANT<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper reconstructs Kant\u2019s cognitive subjectivity (transcendental as well as empirical one) by tracing both the text of the Critique of Pure Reason and some important relevant analyses conducted by Kantians within recent thirty years. The aim of the reconstruction is to consider how and if at all the concept of Kant\u2019s subject may be used in today\u2019s investigations on cognition. The non-eliminable multiplicity of interpretations of each important aspect of this subjectivity is demonstrated. Some doubtful properties of Kant\u2019s construction of subjectivity are revealed; they call into question the applicability of this construction to now formed apprehensions of cognition.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0Kant\u2019s subjectivity, cognition, John Niemeyer Findlay, David Carr, Siyaves Azeri, Andrew Brook.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Barbara Trybulec<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Sk\u0142odowska University, Marii Curie-Sk\u0142odowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: barbara.trybulec@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

MIND: EMBEDDED OR EXTENDED? THE TENSION IN THE THEORY OF THE SITUATED MIND<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The situated mind is a new stream in the philosophy of mind. By some, it is perceived as a revolution in the field, or even as a paradigm change. Philosophers working on this new perspective try to create a unified and fruitful interdisciplinary project, aimed to shed a new light on problems of cognition. This task, if possible, is not easy. The Situated Mind is composed of at least three notions that could hardly be thought to present a unified picture of the mind: Embodied Mind, Extended Mind and Embedded Mind. These notions indicate a tension within the project that weakens its integrity. In the paper, I will investigate how strong this tension is, and, specifically, whether the various approaches to Situated Mind are really competitive, or maybe there is a hope for a unified new picture of the mind. I will argue that such a picture cannot be created by combining this three ideas, and will show that one of them is the most useful and fruitful description of the mind.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0situated mind, embedded mind, embodied mind, cognitive processes.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Ignacy Szczeniowski<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmie\u015bcie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: ignacy.szczeniowski@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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NONCONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI\u2019S POSTULATE OF THE CLARITY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The article offers a few remarks on Kazimierz Twardowski\u2019s thesis about the clarity of the philosophical style. The issue is discussed in the context of\u00a0the\u00a0problem of nonconceptual thinking and non-propositional knowledge. A short history of the polemic in the Lvov-Warsaw School serves as an introduction to further methodological and epistemological considerations.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The main subject of the comment is the work entitled About the Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style by the Polish philosopher. Twardowski\u2019s article remains pertinent to the metaphilosophical discussion concerning the status of philosophical language and\u2014which is overlooked in most studies\u2014to the debate concerning conceptualization and communication at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind and language. The\u00a0polemic with Twardowski\u2019s thesis that unclear style of philosophical works is indicative of the ambiguity of philosophical thinking, is presented in the three stages. I discuss Twardowski\u2019s thesis that we think with words, and two theses by David Einhorn: that an object which cannot be grasped by concepts, cannot be known at all, and that the only access to thought we have is by means of words.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0knowledge, concepts, Kazimierz Twardowski, clarity, know how.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Anna Michalska<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy \u015awiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: michalskanna@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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PRAGMATISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE IN THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME IN THE LIGHT OF THE SENSORIMOTOR CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In the article, I propose a thesis that pragmatism offers a way out of the performative conflict inherent in the quest for the laws of change in conceptual frameworks, i.e. the conflict between the explicit notion of change and the implicit notion of continuity.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

To this end, I interpret two main theses of pragmatism\u2014the strict relationship between theory and action and between language and conditions of its use\u2014in the light of the sensorimotor conception of experience. This conception\u2014introduced by Jean Piaget and now advanced within cognitive neuroscience\u2014imposes certain constraints on the way in which both theses might be construed, thus eliminating all one-sided versions of pragmatism. The conflict between continuity and change might be overcome in that it is not an object construed as an item of a certain kind, but a pattern of action is what constitutes the proper reference of thoughts and concepts. The change in the pattern or scheme of action is a resultant upon a series of adaptations subordinated to the mechanism of executive control, which encompasses the ability of planning and reflecting upon the incomes of one\u2019s own and others\u2019 actions.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0conceptual framework, pragmatism, sensorimotor conception of experience, rational development.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Pawe\u0142 Zeidler<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Pozna\u0144, Szamarzewskiego 89 c, 60-568 Pozna\u0144, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: zeidlerp@amu.edu.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABOUT THE ROLE OF EMPIRICALLY-GROUNDED METAPHORS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Along with the formulation by Max Black the interactive theory of metaphor, the philosophers of science began to analyze the role of metaphors in scientific cognition. It has been shown that metaphors can play different functions in all stages of the creation of scientific knowledge. In this paper I focus on the analysis of the role of metaphors in the account of empirical data and their impact on the constitution of scientific research programmes. I present views on this issue formulated \u200b\u200bby Max Black, Mary Hesse, Richard Boyd, Thomas Kuhn, Daniela Bailer-Jones, and especially by John Styles, who analyzed in detail the role that empirically-grounded metaphors play in science. In the last paragraph of the paper, I consider the impact of metaphors on the constitution of the research programme of Bohr’s atomic structure in the context of the Imre Lakatos\u2019s methodology of scientific research programmes.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0interactive theory of metaphor, empirically-grounded metaphor, scientific research programme.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Mariusz Mazurek<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Lublin University of Technology Nadbystrzycka 38 D, 20-618 Lublin, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: mariusz.mazurek@pollub.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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SCIENTIFIC MODELS IN RONALD GIERE\u2019S CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper reconstructs and analyzed critically Ronald N. Giere\u2019s view on scientific models situated within his model conception of science. It is demonstrated that Giere\u2019s conception of science is too poor: it is not capable of determining certain properties of models postulated in it. First of all, it does not present clearly their status of non-linguistic, abstract entities, nor the 4-ary relation of representation.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0representation, theory, models, relation of similarity, Ronald Giere\u2019s account of scientific models.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Marek Szyd\u0142owski<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Astronomical Observatory of the Jagiellonian University, Orla 171, 30-244 Krak\u00f3w, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: marek.szydlowski@uj.edu.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE COSMOLOGICAL MODEL<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The standard cosmological model plays a crucial role in the research practice of modern cosmology. We examine ontological and epistemological aspects of this model, and its roles in the research practice of cosmology. We have found that there is not one distinguished ontology of the cosmological model. We point out different ontologies fitting it. The epistemological significance of the notion of cosmological model is also investigated, and complex epistemological roles of this notion are determined. We suggest that that the model is not an object belonging to one ontology, but it is a mixture of elements belonging to different ontological categories.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:\u00a0<\/strong>ontology and epistemology of cosmological model, methodology of cosmology.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Marek \u0141agosz<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, University of Wroclaw, Koszarowa 3\/20, 51-149 Wroc\u0142aw, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: lagosz@o2.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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THE UNIVERSE: INFINITY AND TIME<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The considerations presented in this paper elaborate and complete some threads examined in my published book Realno\u015b\u0107 czasu [The Reality of Time]. I extend here the earlier sketched inifinistic (multi-world) and dynamic image of real being. I propose a model \u201cof circular causality\u201d, I argue for an asymmetric version of causal theory of time, and I present an ontological interpretation of Bolzano-Dedekind definition of infinite set.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0time, real being, circular causality, causal theory of time, Bolzano-Dedekind\u2019s definition of finite set, infinity of the universe.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Jaros\u0142aw Mrozek<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gda\u0144sk, Ba\u017cynskiego 4, 80-952 Gda\u0144sk, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: filjam@univ.gda.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

MATHEMATICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRONG PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The sociology of science propagates the thesis about the social nature of all knowledge, however, Karl Mannheim, the most eminent representative of this way of thinking, tends to treat mathematics and logic differently. Mannheim considered mathematics and logic as disciplines of knowledge which are not amenable to social determination. The representatives of the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge raise once again the problem of the status of mathematics and logic. They aim to show that these sciences can be also reasonably analysed by means of sociological tools. In their considerations they refer to the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Imre Lakatos. They are convinced that Wittgenstein\u2019s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and Lakatos\u2019s Proofs and Refutations opened a way to a sociological approach to mathematics.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0mathematics, sociology, Strong Programme, status of mathematics.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Andrzej Wilk<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy \u015awiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: awilk@ifispan.waw.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

CHAOS AND INCOMPUTABILITY<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The paper is devoted to the problem of the implementation of incomputability in the real world. It considers the following basic question: has logical noneffectiveness its realization in the physical world or, has non-algorithmicity a physical\/material medium? The conclusion is: the algorithmically interpreted theory of deterministic chaos corresponds with the non-random\/decidable part of mathematics. It should be, however, taken into account that it is always the nonalgorithmicity, randomness of models in which a description is formed.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0theory of computability, theory of chaos, Church\u2019s thesis.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Maciej Sopek<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmie\u015bcie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: riven213@gmail.com<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

THE SEMANTIC WEB\u2014INTRODUCING MEANING TO THE INTERNET<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The aim of the present article is to explore selected philosophical aspects of the World Wide Web, with particular emphasis on the Semantic Web technologies. This is motivated by the conviction that the Web as such provides grounds for philosophical investigation, and at the same time remains a subject that is rarely approached from philosophical perspective. The article contains a brief sketch of the development of the World Wide Web and emphasizes the conceptual novelty that the Semantic technologies introduce to the area; as well as examples of their practical application. Some of the notions approached in the article include meaning, reference and the question of the ontological status of objects being part of the Web.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0internet, web, semantics, designators, meaning, reference<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

\n

Andrzej Gecow<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Centre for Ecological Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, Dziekanow Lesny, 05-092 \u0141omianki, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: gecow@op.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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HEREDITARY INFORMATION AND THEIR CHANNELS<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The presented second part of the Draft of the Deductive Theory of Life cannot be understood without studying the first one, where the basic notions used here are defined. Inheritance is a transfer of collected purposeful information to descendant. The description of propagation of purposeful information is here broadened by the cycle of the object and environment, also the spatial and functional heterogeneity of environment. The description of hereditary channels needs to call the model of covering as structural tendency. The description of the theoretical base of this model will be a theme of next parts of the Draft; here only intuitive base is shown. Inheritance concerns a part of changeability controlled by purposeful information, but covering concern random part of changeability. The place in the Draft and mutual references of both these models are discussed. The model of inheritance proposed here is closely connected to works of Eva Jablonka. It offers more clear and formal theoretical bases for her results.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0deductive theory of life, inheritance, environment, object, hereditary channels.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n

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Krzysztof Chodasewicz<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Affiliation: Academy of Physiotherapy, Tadeusza Ko\u015bciuszki 4, 50-038 Wroc\u0142aw, Poland<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

E-mail: kchodasewicz@o2.pl<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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EMERGENCE IN BIOLOGY \u2013 REDUCTIONISM VERSUS ORGANICISM<\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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ABSTRACT<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The article offers a comparative analysis of the views on biological emergence by two philosophizing scientists \u2013 Bernd-Olaf K\u00fcppers and Pier Luigi Luisi. Both authors declare different philosophical positions: the former claims to be a reductionist, while the latter considers himself an organicist. Both scientists differ also in their opinions about whether it is possible to define life. K\u00fcppers is convinced that life cannot be defined, unless it possesses some emergent properties, while Luisi claims that life exhibits emergent features and can be satisfactorily defined. The confrontation of opinions of both authors leads to unexpected conclusions.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Keywords:<\/strong>\u00a0emergence in biology, organicism, mechanicism, downward causation, defining life.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Zdzis\u0142awa Pi\u0105tek\u00a0\u00a0 Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Krak\u00f3w, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krak\u00f3w, Poland E-mail: zdzislawa.piatek33@gmail.com PECULIARITY OF CULTURAL ADAPTATION. THE INSTANCE OF FUNCTIONING OF GENDER STEREOTYPES ABSTRACT The peculiar character of cultural adaptation in relation to biological adaptation consists in the fact that when the former adaptation has arisen the survival of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-933","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-abstracts"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/933","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=933"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/933\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5316,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/933\/revisions\/5316"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=933"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=933"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/filozofiainauka.studiafilozoficzne.edu.pl\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=933"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}