Andrzej Łukasik

Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: lukasik@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl

ON PHYSICISTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY

ABSTRACT

The article analyses physicists’ attitudes towards philosophy on the examples of the positions of eminent theorists. There are two physicists’ philosophical attitudes towards philosophy: pro-philosophical (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, von Weizsäcker, Penrose, Rovelli) and anti-philosophical (Weinberg, Hawking, Feynman). I analyse some physicists’ arguments for or against philosophy. It is demonstrated that physicists are most critical of all philosophical conceptions that accept a priori factors in cognition, while those who recognize the significance of philosophy for science most often refer to the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition as the proper basis for understanding modern physics.

Keywords: physics, philosophy, apriorism, positivism, Platonism, beauty.

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Stanisław Czerniak

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: stanislaw.l.czerniak@wp.pl

MAX SCHELER’S PLURALISTIC CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE

ABSTRACT

This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. I review the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part I accuse Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e., how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities).

Keywords: types of knowledge, induction, essence, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, Max Scheler.

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Pavlo Sodomora

Department of Latin and Foreign Languages, Lviv; Danylo Halytsky National Medical University, Ivan Franko Lviv National University, Department of Philosophy. 

E-mail: pavlosodom@gmail.com

NATURALISM AND CONVENTIONALISM IN PLATO’S DIALOGUES AND NATIVISTIC THEORIES OF LANGUAGE

ABSTRACT

For Plato, language was the way to cognize the universe. The philosophy of language, which was primarily initiated by Plato in the Cratylus, still has not received answers to the questions settled by this great Greek thinker. In fact, it just offered various solutions formed in different conceptions and approaches in the ancient, scholastic, modern and postmodern periods. The questions raised by Plato in his dialogue have been continued in various nativistic theories of language, especially in works of Noam Chomsky. Language—as it is seen by Plato, i.e., as uniting our inner world with the outer world, is a significant feature of humankind, is still underinvestigated. 

Keywords: language, conventionalism, naturalism, interpretation, etymology, semiotics.

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Małgorzata Czarnocka

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: mczarnocka@ifispan.edu.pl

EDMUND HUSSERL’S IDEA OF SCIENCE AND THE PROJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

ABSTRACT

I investigate the idea of science elaborated by Edmund Husserl in his later works, first of all, in Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis of European Sciences. The first part of this investigation has been published in the paper: Edmunda Husserla idea nauki i projekt fenomenologii jako nauki ścisłej [Edmund Husserl’s Idea of Science and the Project of Phenomenology as a Strict Science], Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne, 2019, 7 (2), pp. 247-264. Husserl claims that the transformation of philosophy into a strict science, which is the basic aim of his intel­lectual enterprise, is connected with a reform of all the positive sciences. Positive science is closely related to philosophy—both they have a common grounding and ideal. The paper also compares Husserl’s project of philosophy as a fundamental science with the today trends in philosophy and the plurality of its schools, attitudes, fields of problems and methods.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, ideal of science, phenomenology, positive science.

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Paweł Dziedziul

University of Bialystok, ul. Świerkowa 20 B, 15-328 Białystok, Poland.

E-mail: paweldziedziul@gmail.com

STEVEN PINKER’S MELIORISM 

ABSTRACT

This article considers Steven Pinker’s recent outlook presented in his book Enlightenment Now. The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress. The paper discusses not only current political and philosophical Pinker’s views on a considerable number of evidences in favor of mankind’s progress in the last period. The authors claims that Pinker’s views may serve as an antidote to the contemporary pessimism that is being spread inter alia by mass media. The reader is pulled into a debate regarding issues surrounding the contemporary state of being of the human race. This is something more than just pop-scientific excursion of a well-established specialist beyond his area of expertise, but a valuable aggregate of data enticing also to professionals from the realm of sociology, philosophy and politics. Above all Pinker’s voice should be regarded as a counterbalance to all-pervasive pejorism and however momentary relief.

Keywords: meliorism, pejorism, optimism, progressivism.

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Barbara Trybulec

Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: barbara.trybulec1@gmail.com

THE SUBJECT OR AGENT? UNDERSTANDING SUBJECTIVITY IN THE COGNITIVE ARTEFACTS ERA

ABSTRACT

The philosophical tradition defines the subject as a reflective being, in principle aware of its agency which makes it capable of making free decisions and taking responsibility for them. Agency, understood in this way, is clearly attributed only to people. However, the technological development of artificial cognitive enhancements and of increasingly autonomous artificial intelligence, that has been taken place in last few decades, casts doubts whether such an approach is not too anthropocentric. This doubt is indicated by some proponents of extending cognitive processes beyond the human brain; they argue for the need of appropriate extension of the subject as well. Moreover, there is an increasing number of proposals attributing agency to artifacts. In the first part of the article, I refer to the two most commonly used philosophical criteria distinguishing the subject of cognition from all information processing systems: being a reflective system, and being the subject of intentional stance. Next, I assess, from such a perspective, the attempts to attribute agency to both one-person extended cognitive systems and artificial systems, such as relatively autonomous computer programs. I argue that the gap between conceptions of the extended subject and the artificial subject, and the standard approach incline toward the usage of the term “agent” designating this phenomenon. The term is already widely used in cognitive science to designate any relatively autonomous information processing system performing a cognitive task. The need of the clear distinction between “the subject” (“subjectivity”) and “the agent” (“agency”) is especially noticeable in Polish, where the difference in meanings of these concepts is not so evident as in English. The awareness of the applying in cognitive science these two different notions of agency prevents against a conceptual misuse which could lead to erroneous explanations and predictions.

Keywords: subject, agent, agency, extended mind thesis, extended cognitive system, cognitive enhancement, artificial cognitive system.

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Magdalena Łata, Andrzej Łukasik

Magdalena Łata – University of Warsaw, ul. Nowy Świat 69, 00-001 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: magdalena.lata@onet.eu

Andrzej Łukasik – Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: lukasik@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl

IS TRUTH ALWAYS BEAUTIFUL, THAT IS, HOW AESTHETIC VALUES CAN BECOME AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBSTACLE

ABSTRACT

The article presents the main functions of aesthetic values (beauty, simplicity, symmetry) in the process of formulating, evaluating and accepting scientific theories in the work of physicist: 1) they motivate to undertake scientific research; (2) have a heuristic role which enables the direction of the search for a new theory to be selected; (3) are a criterion for choosing between empirically equivalent theories in the absence of empirical evidences and (4) sometimes constitute an epistemological obstacle. The basic thesis of the work is that aesthetic values, in addition to positive functions, also play a negative role in science, hindering the acceptance of new theories or leading to inefficient research. Too much weight on the aesthetic side of theory can pose a threat to the objectivity of scientific cognition.

Keywords: beauty, symmetry, simplicity, true, epistemological obstacle, nonempirical criteria.

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Zdzisława Piątek

Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland.

E-mail: zdzislawa.piatek33@gmail.com

ABOUT THE NATURE OF HUNTING – THE PRESENT, THE PAST, AND THE FUTURE

ABSTRACT

The paper discusses three stages in the development of hunting. Initially hunting had an adaptive value and contributed to the process of evolution of humanoids. When animals were domesticated hunting rituals still constituted an important element of cultural identity and were subject to various transformations due to the pressure from the state and the church. In the contemporary world, under the influence of ecology we witness the emergence of a new ethics which changes man’s relationship to animals. Hunting cannot be reconciled with the morality of modern hu­manity. Some people demand a complete ban on hunting or that only bloodless tradition should be continued.

Keywords: hunting, evolution of humanoids, morality, modern humanity, ecology.

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Marcin Urbaniak

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Cracow, ul. Podchorążych 2, Poland.

E-mail: murbaniak78@gmail.com

ON THE NATURAL-SOCIAL HARMFULNESS OF HUNTING PRACTICES

ABSTRACT

The current model of hunting economy, focused mainly on killing innumerable number of game species and finding joy and benefit in it, does not totally fulfil crite­ria of sustainable, ethical and rational management. This work provides an overview of evidences that the moral evil of hunting, together with the whole hunting culture, are not rationally justifiable. I am going to validate there is no reasonable argument for maintaining hunting economy and culture in the on-going, archaic condition. I maintain that therefore an immediate system reform of our hunting economy is necessary. There is a broad list of objection to the different aspects of hunting practices, which are presented and discussed in short in the paper. A reformed hunting institution, endowed with veterinary service, should guard some animals’ interests by different strategies of assuaging some conflicts among people and animals, as catching alive, flushing, separating or biosafety and professional reprocessing of infected corpses. The main recommendation for the ossified hunting tradition is the appeal for listening to the opinion of experts in natural sciences.

Keywords: hunting, hunting ethics, hunting culture, hunting practices, biosafety.

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Emanuele Coco

University of Catania, Italy; LAIOS-IIAC, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences. 

E-mail: emanuele.coco@unict.it

THE PHILOSOPHER AHEAD OF HIS TIME.

LUDWIK FLECK AND THE COMPLEXITY OF SCIENCE

(COMMUNICATION AND NOTES)

ABSTRACT

The new edition in Italian of the articles by the Polish microbiologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) edited by Francesco Coniglione offers the opportunity for some considerations around this significant scholar. Fleck anticipates Kuhn’s ideas as well as those of the sociology of science. For him, any epistemology that does not take psychological and sociological methods into account, or that does not concern itself with economics, technology, art, and even politics, is an epistemology imaginabilis. Here we discuss some key points of the essays collected in the book, some observations taken from the rich introduction of the editor, and an inevitable question: Why has Fleck been neglected for so long?

Keywords: Philosophy of science, sociology of science, Thomas Kuhn, Ludwik Fleck, thought collective, thought style.

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Zbysław Muszyński

Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: zmuszyn@gmail.com

LEON KOJ’S SEMIOTIC CONDITION FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

ABSTRACT

Major works by Leon Koj deal with the issues of semiotics, logics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and ethics. Many of them refer to aspects of communication, however, this is not the main subject of his considerations. These references relate to the problems of satisfying: 1. the logical criteria, 2. the methodological criteria, 3. the ethical criteria, 4. the semiotic criteria. This article is dedicated to defining the semiotic criteria. It briefly covers basic semiotic notions present in Koj’s works. On the basis of Koj’s assumptions the concept of semiotics conditions for the realisation and functions of the communication process is defined.

Keywords: Leon Koj, communication, understanding, beliefs, rationality, criticism.

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Józef Dębowski 

Institute of Philosophy, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, ul. Kurta Obitza 1, 10-725 Olsztyn, Poland.

E-mail: jozdeb@poczta.onet.pl

THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY OF THE SIGN. LEON KOJ’S POINT OF VIEW

ABSTRACT

The article consists of two parts. In the first one (introductory) I recall—following Edmund Husserl, Stanisław Ossowski and Adam Schaff—the main formulations of the “principle of transparency of the sign.” In these formulations it is usually said about (1) the transparency of the sign regarding objects denoted by the sign (denoted, designated and/or named), or (2) the transparency of the sign regarding its meaning (respectively, events, states of affairs and facts designated by the sign). However, as Husserl pointed out, one can also speak about (3) the transparency of the sign in relations to the activities and mental states of the sign’s users (senders and recipients). After all, only due to the transparency of the sign understood in this way, it is possible for people to communicate with each other, thus the sign can also has an expressive and communicative function. In turn, the second part of the article (essential) contains a reconstruction of the Leon Koj’s approach; Koj gave a consistently formalized form to the theory of sign based on the principle of transparency—the form of an axiomatized logical system (using Quine’s formalism from his Mathematical Logic). One of Koj’s main goals was also to indicate the close relationship between semantics and pragmatics, and even the primacy of pragmatics over semantics. Formal-logical tools have also shown that the theory of sign based on the principle of transparency neither contravene The Law of Non-Contradiction (at least in its psychological formulation), nor contain or imply semantic antinomies such us antinomy of the liar. Because it is a theory easily negotiable with Alfred Tarski’s theory of language levels.

Keywords: logic, axiomatized logical system, semiotic, semantic, pragmatic, sign, meaning, denoted, designated, intentionality, the transparency of the sign, the principle of transparency, expressive function of the sign, communicative function of the sign, semantic antinomies. 

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Paweł Bytniewski

Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: bytniewski@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl

ALINA MOTYCKA — PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE

ABSTRACT

In the paper, I present the views of Alina Motycka, a Polish philosopher of science who died in 2018. I place Motycka’s scholar activity in a historical context, relative to two traditions of the philosophy of science—its historical version signed by Thomas Kuhn, and the tradition of logical reconstruction of science which in the second half of the twentieth century was revived by the thought of Karl Popper. I believe that this historical situation forms the context in which Motycka shaped her view of the philosophy of science and, because of such a particular context, she has participated in it with her own problematizations. So, what constitutes the originality of her way? Two issues come to the fore here. The first is the reconstruction of the fundamental problem of the philosophy of science, which, according to Motycka, is the question of confronting two scientific theories, of which the earlier (T1) is replaced by a later and competitive one (T2). Motycka shows the inability of the epistemology of the second half of the 20th century to adequately capture this relationship. The reason for this is the lack of intellectual means to problematize the situation T1–T2. The second area of the author’s interest is the issue of creativity in science. She was inspired by the theories of Carl G. Jung. In this context, it is of interest to use the philosophy of science of terms such as archetype and myth.

Keywords: Alina Motycka, philosophy of science, epistemology, C.G. Jung, archetypes, myth.

 

Jacek Koronacki

Institute of Computer Science Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Jana Kazimierza 5, 01-248 Warsaw, Poland.

Email: jacek.koronacki@ipipan.waw.pl

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE DISENCHANTED WORLD

ABSTRACT

This is a modest endeavour written from an engineering perspective by a nonphilosopher to set things straight if somewhat roughly: What does artificial intelligence boil down to? What are its merits and why some dangers may stem from its development in this time of confusion when, to quote Rémi Brague: “From the point of view of technology, man appears as outdated, or at least superfluous”?

Keywords: artificial intelligence, strong artificial intelligence, machine learning, disenchanted world.

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Witold Marciszewski

International Center for Formal Ontology, affiliated at Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: witmar@calculemus.org

THE COMPUTATIONAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENCE

ABSTRACT

Science means here mathematics and those empirical disciplines which avail themselves of mathematical models. The pragmatic approach is conceived in Karl R. Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (p. 276) sense: a logical appraisal of the success of a theory amounts to the appraisal of its corroboration. This kind of appraisal is exemplified in section 6 by a case study—on how Isaac Newton justified his theory of gravitation. The computational approach in problem-solving processes consists in considering them in terms of computability: either as being performed according to a model of computation in a narrower sense, e.g., the Turing machine, or in a wider perspective—of machines associated with a non-mechanical device called “oracle” by Alan Turing (1939). Oracle can be interpreted as computertheoretic representation of intuition or invention. Computational approach in another sense means considering problem-solving processes in terms of logical gates, supposed to be a physical basis for solving problems with a reasoning. Pragmatic rationalism about science, seen at the background of classical rationalism (Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz etc.), claims that any scientific idea, either in empirical theories or in mathematics, should be checked through applications to problem-solving processes. Both the versions claim the existence of abstract objects, available to intellectual intuition. The difference concerns the dynamics of science: (i) the classical rationalism regards science as a stationary system that does not need improvements after having reached an optimal state, while (ii) the pragmatical version conceives science as evolving dynamically due to fertile interactions between creative intuitions, or inventions, with mechanical procedures. The dynamics of science is featured with various models, like Derek J. de Solla Price’s exponential and Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm model (the most familiar instances). This essay suggests considering Turing’s idea of oracle as a complementary model to explain most adequately, in terms of exceptional inventiveness, the dynamics of mathematics and mathematizable empirical sciences.

Keywords: algorithm, behavioral (vs declarative) knowledge, computability, corroboration, innate knowledge, intuition, invention, logic gates, oracle, pragmatic (vs classical) rationalism, problem-solving, reasoning, symbolic logic, Turing machine.

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Kazimierz Trzęsicki

University of Bialystok, ul. Świerkowa 20B, 15-328 Białystok, Poland.

E-mail: kasimir4701@gmail.com

THE IDEA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

ABSTRACT

Artificial Intelligence, both as a hope of making a substantial progress, and a fear of the unknown and unimaginable, has its roots in human dreams. These dreams were materialized by means of rational intellectual efforts. We see beginnings of such a process in Lullus’s fancies. Many scholars and enthusiasts participated in the development of Lullus’s art, ars combinatoria. Amongst them, Athanasius Kircher was distinguished. Gottfried Leibniz ended the period in which the idea of artificial intelligence had been shaped, and started a new one when artificial intelligence could be considered a part of science, according to today’s standards.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, ars combinatoria, Ramon Lullus, Athanasius Kircher, Gottfried Leibniz

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Andrzej Targowski, Henryk Krawczyk

Andrzej Targowski – Western Michigan University (1980–2017).

E-mail: andrew.targowski@wmich.edu

Henryk Krawczyk – Polska Akademia Nauk; Centrum Informatyczne Trójmiejskiej Akademickiej Sieci Komputerowej.

E-mail: hkrawk@pg.edu.pl

INOFORMATICS AS A FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE SUPPORTING HUMAN ENDEAVORS

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to answer the question of whether informatics is a field or just a discipline of knowledge. Analyzes of info-computer-based problems, consider that informatics in Poland should be treated as a field. It was emphasized that the English term computer science is only one of the informatics-oriented specializations. The word “informatics” can be associated much more often with terms; IT in the US and ICT in Europe except France, where l’informatique terminology is used). Which name to use since the narrow understanding of information processing and handling is losing its full potential for the right development. In practice, it means a reduction in undertaking ambitious tasks and the higher costs of its development. Social implications confirmed that, despite a lot of capable informaticians, Poland had not been seen (except for computer devices), the right development of informatics-oriented applications. Hence the essential general informaticsoriented strategy is offered because the digital equipment-oriented strategy alone is not enough to apply in success looking ICT applications.

Keywords: informatics, computer science, ICT, informatic strategy, social implications of informatics.

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Mariusz Mazurek

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: mmazurek@ifispan.waw.pl

ON VIRTUAL OBJECTS

ABSTRACT

The article presents a brief exposition of alternative ways of creating virtual objects and the status of their existence inspired by the relevant views of Plato, Aristotle, Franz Brentano and Karl Popper as well as various conceptions of representation. I argue that the present state of research on the problem of “computer” virtuality shows that it is necessary to explore first the ontological issues of virtual objects. Only these issues will solve the mystery of the creation and existence of virtual objects. The consideration of these issues are suppressed by the fact that contemporary philosophy has removed both metaphysics and, with-it, ontology. That is why, and for reasons for reasons of substantive accuracy, I show how traditional ontological and ontologically inspiring approaches are—when modified— promising candidates for exploring the nature of virtual objects, first of all, problems of their existence and creation.

Keywords: virtuality, virtual object, virtual reality, representation in computer sciences.

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Andrzej Kiepas

Institute of Education and Communication Research, Silesian University of Technology, ul. Hutnicza 9, 44-100 Gliwice, Poland.

E-mail: andrzej.kiepas@us.edu.pl

THE HUMAN BEING IN THE WORLD OF DIGITALIZING PROCESSES – PRESENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE EFFECTS

ABSTRACT

The article focuses on selected problems which have now appeared and fall under the ideas “industry 4.0” and “society 5.0”, namely on anthropological issues. Changes in the relationships between man and technology based on trust lead to an increase of the role of the technological factor in these relations. Other aspects of the analyzed changes concern the new requirements of the responsibility and changes of human subjectivity and rationality. The future of man appears to be an area of uncertainty related to inter alia the conditions of functioning and living in the order of the post-digital world.

Keywords: industry 4.0, society 5.0, subjectivity, post-digital world.

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Beata Witkowska-Maksimczuk

Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: bwitkows@ans.pw.edu.pl

DIGITAL COMMUNISM

ABSTRACT

The article presents the phenomenon of increasing sharing in-formations for free on the Internet and the contemporary development of gift economy in the form of a movement most often called cybercommunism. The article points out two basic attitudes in treating information. According to the first one, information should be treated as a commodity to which property rights can be attributed and which is subject to market play. This involves such issues as copyright, fees, licenses and other ways of protecting the interests of market players. The second attitude is to treat valuable information as a common good, often with a moral imperative to share it (to varying degrees Open Source and Open Acces, the idea of copyleft, DIY, P2P network, YouTube, The Pirate Bay domain etc.). Since every concept or movement proclaiming a community of goods is called communism (in a broader sense of the word, in a narrower sense it is a specific political system, e.g. the Soviet Union), today we are dealing with digital communism on the Internet. Some researchers (Firer-Blaess, Fuchs) point to Wikipedia as an example. The Internet encyclopedia operates on the basis of principles that go beyond the capitalist way of production and represent an informational-communist way of production: in the subjective dimension, it is a cooperative work and in the objective dimension, a shared ownership of the means of production. The text also presents the division of ethics into an abstract and concrete one, applied to the behaviour of network users. If someone within the framework of an abstract ethics preaches the principle of “You will not pirate.” (copying and distributing illegally) is a corresponding principle of specific ethics that says “You will not pirate unless O1 or O2…or he.” In practice, concrete ethics push many Internet users to treat Internet resources as a common good, from which everyone can draw according to their own needs. Digital communism can be treated, on the one hand, as a partially implemented idea and, on the other, as a postulate. From an axiological point of view, this postulate would be connected with the Internet implementation of equality (access to resources for everyone) and freedom (access to all information).

Keywords: digital communism, cybercommunism, information ownership, concrete ethics, abstract ethics, community of goods.

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Jacek Gurczyński

Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: jacek.gurczynski@umcs.lublin.pl

ON VALUES IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT. CYPHER’S CHOICE

ABSTRACT

The paper tries to defend the thesis that it is impossible to decide upon moral issues without any references to the ontology of the world we live in. An illustrative example of the main argumentation line is the choice made by Cypher—a second plan character in the movie Matrix. Cypher decides to betray human rebels fighting against machines for freedom and, as a reward, accepts affluent life in the virtual reality. His choice seems to be superficially reprehensible because of the abandonment of the real world and authentic life. However, one can argue that the dichotomy between the real and virtual world is seeming. By choosing the virtual reality Cypher decided to act in a world which, like the real world, makes it possible to be a moral subject and enables authentic experience. The difference between both the worlds lies in the type of determination limiting any conscious subject. Cypher prefers to live in a world determined by the algorithm of Matrix more than in a world where his behaviour is determined by genes and other biological factors.

Keywords: free will, biological determinism, relativism, semantic anti-realism, ontology of the virtual reality, values in the virtual reality.

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Paweł Polak

Faculty of Philosophy of the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Crocow, ul. Kanonicza 9, 31-002 Crocow, Poland.

E-mail: pawel.polak@upjp2.edu.pl

COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING IN PHILOSOPHY – SOME METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

ABSTRACT

Computational modeling plays an important role in the methodology of contemporary science. The epistemological role of modeling and simulations leads to questions about a possible use of this method in philosophy. Attempts to use some mathematical tools to formulate philosophical concepts trace back to Spinoza and Newton. Newtonian natural philosophy became an example of successful use of mathematical thinking to describe the fundamental level of nature. Newton’s approach has initiated a new scientific field of research in physics and at the same time his system has become a source of new philosophical considerations about physical reality. According to Michael Heller, some physical theories may be treated as the formalizations of philosophical conceptions. Computational modeling may be an extension of this idea; this is what I would like to present in the article. I also consider computational modeling in philosophy as a source of new philosophical metaphors; this idea has been proposed in David J. Bolter’s conception of defining technology. The consideration leads to the following conclusion: In the methodology of philosophy significant changes have been taking place; the new approach do not make traditional methods obsolete, it is rather a new analytical tools for philosophy and a source of inspiring metaphors.

Keywords: Computational modeling, methodology of philosophy, defining technology.

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Paweł Stacewicz

Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: p.stacewicz@ans.pw.edu.pl

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE CONCEPTS FOR PHILOSOPHY ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIGITALITY AND ANALOGICITY

ABSTRACT

In this paper we show how formal computer science concepts—such as encoding, algorithm or computability—can be interpreted philosophically, including ontologically and epistemologically. Such interpretations lead to questions and problems, the working solutions of which constitute some form of pre-philosophical worldview. In this work we focus on questions inspired by the IT distinction between digitality and analogicity, which has its mathematical origin in the mathematical distinction between discreteness and continuity. These include the following questions: 1) Is the deep structure of physical reality digital or analog, 2) does the hu man mind resemble a more digital or analog computational system, 3) does the answer to the second question give us a cognitively fruitful insight into the cognitive limitations of the mind? As a particularly important basis for the above questions, we consider the fact that the computational power (i.e., the range of solvable problems) of some types of analog computations is greater than that of digital computations.

Keywords: information, digitality, analogicity, computing power, computational worldview.

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Sławomir Leciejewski

Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Szamarzewskiego 89 c, 60-568 Poznań, Poland.

E-mail: slaaw@amu.edu.pl

THE BIG DATA PROBLEM IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES

ABSTRACT

In the paper the phenomenon of big data is presented. I pay my special attention to the relation of this phenomenon to research work in experimental sciences. I search for answers to two questions. First, do the research methods proposed within the paradigm big data can be applied in experimental sciences? Second, does applying the research methods subject to the big data paradigm lead, in consequence, to a new understanding of science?

Keywords: big data, experimental sciences, philosophy of science, methodology of science.

Leszek Kuźnicki  

Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology Polish Academy of Sciences 3 Pasteur Street 02-093 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: l.kuznicki@nencki.gov.pl  

WHETHER AND HOW TO DEFINE LIFE?

ABSTRACT

Biology is a science on life. This definition, concise and most commonly used, is satisfactory for almost everybody. It is otherwise when one asks: What is life? Then it appears that no one feature can be indicated which distinguishes “the living” from “the non-living.” The author presents the sources of these difficulties and then gives his own attempt to solve the problem of definition of live—which is based on the idea of levels of the biological organization. In author’s view, to characterise the objects of research in biology we should apply not one concept of life (or of living organism) but three concepts: of organized biological matter (for the molecular and sub-cellular levels), of living organism (for the level of the specimen), and of life (for the sphere of phenomena which occur on the population-species-biocenotic level).

Keywords: definition of life, living organism, organized biological matter.  

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Krzysztof Chodasewicz

LIFE, LIVING INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISMS

ABSTRACT

This paper presents an outline of the relationship between the categories of living individual, organism and life. I argue that although these categories are related with each other and often treated as the same, we should strive for their separation. The main argument for the distinction between the individual and life is of a methodological character: the definitions of life are mainly interested for astrobiologists and scientists working in the field of origin of life or artificial life, while the individual is important, among others, in standard evolutionary biology and ecology. Among the concepts of living individual various forms of evolutionary definition (individual as a unit of selection) currently dominate. The living individual understood in this way is not identical with a structurally limited and functionally integrated self-sustained entity, which is usually called “organism.” Moreover, the explanatory success of the evolutionary concept of individual, in my opinion, implies the adoption of some version of the evolutionary definition of life. In the last part of this paper I propose a process-evolutionary definition of life, which also indicates a relationship between the three aforementioned categories.

Keywords: living individual, the concept of organism, defining of life.  

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Adrianna Grabizna  

Institute of Psychology, The University of Zielona Góra, Al. Wojska Polskiego 69, 65-762 Zielona Góra, Poland.  

E-mail: a.grabizna@wpps.uz.zgora.pl    

„LIKE MOTHER, LIKE DAUGHTER — EVO-DEVO AND THE CONCEPT OF EXTENDED INHERITANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OF THE TRANSGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ATTACHMENT STYLE AND MENTALIZING CAPACITY”

ABSTRACT

Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo-Devo) is becoming to be popular in psychology, and by certain is even seen as a new biology for psychology (Hofer 2014). In particular, it is about the concept of extended inheritance This concept claims to be (neo-) Lamarckian. According to it inherited is everything that contributes to resemblance across generations and that strongly affects the fitness of the offspring—starting by nuclear genes, by genes expression, maternal care, ecological niche, cultural niche, language, etc. In this paper I analyse the potential of the concept of extended inheritance on the example of transgenerational transmission of attachment style and mentalizing capacity. I present the neuroendocrine mechanism of transmission. Then I show that a) DNA methylation is complementary to neuroendocrine mechanism, but it does not revolutionize the latter as it is claimed; b) the concept of extended inheritance confounds the three questions rightly separated by Neo-Darwinism: origin of variation, fate of variation and inheritance, c) although the motivation of Evo-Devo goes against the alleged genetic determinism of neodarwinism, the concept of transgeneration inheritance is determinist (although it is an epigeneetic determinism).

Keywords: Evo-Devo, extended inheritance, attachment style, mentalizing, transgenerational inheritance.

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Ewa Joanna Godzińska  

Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology Polish Academy of Sciences 3 Pasteur Street 02-093 Warsaw, Poland. 

E-mail: egodzinska@nencki.gov.pl    

ETHOLOGY AND WHAT NEXT? SOME PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS INFLUENCING THE RESEARCH ON ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR

ABSTRACT

Animal behaviour and its underlying causal factors are investigated by numerous behavioural sciences. Ethology, one of the most important classical behavioural sciences, is concerned with the description and quantification of behaviour and the analysis of a wide spectre of its causal factors. Ethology also lays stress on the importance of comparative behavioural research and field research. Specific behaviour paterns were considered by classical ethology as elements of hierarchically organised behavioural systems focused on specific functions. The notion of instinct was, however, far from unequivocal and is no more frequently used in behavioural sciences. We also know that information flow between the levels of organization existing in the nervous system and in living systems in general is multidirectional. The assumption that processes running on higher levels of organization can and should be explained solely in terms of processes running on lower levels becomes thus largely groundless. In behavioural sciences reductionism can manifest itself also as the so called law of parsimony adopted during explanations of observed phenomena (Occam’s razor, Lloyd Morgan’s canon). Since the introduction of Karl Popper’s falisifiability criterion to the methodology of scientific research, reductionistic explanations of observed phenomena are, however, less frequently proposed in behavioural sciences. Instead, an approach currently used involves experimental testing of sets of hypotheses proposing alternative explanations of the observed phenomena, not necessarily the simplest ones. Classical ethology was the so called objectivist science of behaviour: its adherents did not deny the existence of subjective phenomena in animals, however, explanations of mechanisms of investigated phenomena in terms of underlying subjective processes were not considered to be sufficient. Presently we may put forward increasingly daring hypotheses concerning subjective experiences of animals thanks to the development of advanced techniques of neuroimaging such as the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Behavioural sciences are constantly progressing and their methods become increasingly sophisticated. We can thus hope that philosophy and behavioural sciences will continue during a long time yet to contribute jointly to achieve new insights enriching our knowledge on factors influencing animal and human behaviour.

Keywords: ethology, behavioural sciences, instinct, information flow, reductionism, law of parsimony, falsifiability, subjective processes.  

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Józef Andrzej Stuchliński  

Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland.

E-mail: pelnomocnik@wszechnicapolska.home.pl    

ON FORMAL MODELS OF FACTORS AND MECHANISMS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION

ABSTRACT

Two formal types of models of living processes, especially evolutionary ones, may be distinguished: the well-known mathematical type and the less-known logical one. The latter applies the terms “class” or “set”; both the terms are understood either in a collective sense (in mereology) or in a distributive sense (in set theory). These formal terms may be used among others to such organic multiplicities as populations or species of organisms, and to organic constituents (molecules, cells, organs) of living organism. Collective concepts refer to objects existing in nature, whereas distributive concepts refer to the linguistic and research constructions of models of natural objects, developed to cognitively grasp natural regularities.

Keywords: factors and mechanisms of evolution, mathematical model, logical model, classes and sets understood collectively, classes and sets understood distributively.  

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Andrzej Gecow  

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: gecow@op.pl; andrzejgecow@gmail.com   

A CURRENT RETURN TO LAMARCK IN AGREEMENT WITH DARWIN

ABSTRACT

Currently, the “Lamarckian dimension” and “Lamarckian mechanisms” are vividly discussed, indicating that they are compatible with Darwinism. However, they require an extension of Modern Synthesis to Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Both the terms, unfortunately connected to Lamarck, really indicate a group of phenomena which can be symbolized by Jablonka’s wording: “some evolutionary changes are non-random in origin, or even result from instruction.” The Lamarckian mechanisms leading to these evolutionary changes arose, however, in the Darwinian way much earlier. This earlier stage is said too rarely, and the typical understanding of Lamarckism strongly suggests its lack. The term “Lamarckism” was and is understood very differently both at different times and in different national and ideological traditions but usually fraught with a simplified understanding of Lamarck. Most of the controversies in these issues arise from the insufficient precision of the utterance, and this from undervaluation of definition, specification of assumptions and abstract reasoning.

Keywords: Lamarkism, Lamarkian mechanisms, heredity, Extendent Evolutionary Synthesis.

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Krzysztof Chodasewicz 

LIFE AND MIND. TWO SIDES OF THHE SAME?

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to discuss possible connections between the categories of mind and life. Some authors argue that life and mind are closely connected or even are two sides of the same phenomenon. I analyze and examine this thesis in the light of different approaches to defining life: the metabolic approach (which stresses the importance of self-maintenance and self-making) and the evolutionary approach (which focuses on evolution by natural selection). The first way of defining life is Maturana and Varela’ conception of autopoiesis, the second is Korzeniewski’s cybernetic definition of life and van Hateren’s modified Darwinian definition of life. Especially interesting is the possibility of connecting mind and life in the evolutionary framework. The text does not provide exact results, but rather it proposes possible modes of thinking of the relation of these two categories.

Keywords: definition of life, relations between life and mind, life and cognition, autopoiesis, cybernetic definition of life, Darwinian definition of life. 

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Aleksander A. Ziemny  

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Szamarzewskiego 89 c, 60-568 Poznań, Poland.

E-mail: aleksander.ziemny@amu.edu.pl    

ISSUES WITH GENE CONCEPT

ABSTRACT

This article provides an initial analysis, from a historical standpoint, of the problematic nature of conceptualizations of the notion of gene in molecular genetics. The starting point is an historical outline of the relation between classical genetics and molecular genetics; it is indicated how the conceptual baggage of classical genetics influenced the development of the concepts of gene used later in molecular biology. I also reveal two problems of genes in the philosophy of science, i.e., skepticism concerning genes and the concept of nominal gene. I conclude that concept of gene functioning within the framework of molecular genetics should be considered from the point of view of experimentalism and pragmatism. It seems that the concept of gene on the molecular level should be conceptualized—in order to remain functional—as broadly as possible and in relation to genetic material.

Keywords: philosophy of biology, genetics, new experimentalism. 

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Iwona Olejniczak  

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Szamarzewskiego 89 c, 60-568 Poznań, Poland.

E-mail: iw.olejniczak@gmail.com   

INTENTIONAL APES BEHAVIOR

ABSTRACT

The main topic of this article is apes’ intentional behaviour. I consider the Michael Tomasello’s concept of intentionality. I outline how different levels of intentionality presented by Tomasello could be applied to apes’ behaviour. To do so I examine few experiments and observations (in natural conditions) of apes’ behaviour and try to apply Tomasello’s intentionality concepts. My main concern is the possibility of group and shared intentionality in ape communities, which could suggest that there is some kind of culture oriented behaviour in non-human animals.

Keywords: intentionality, individual intentionality, joint intentionality, collective intentionality, ape, chimpanzees, natural environment. 

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Leszek Żuk  

Institute of Philosophy, University of Wroclaw, Koszarowa 3/20, 51-149 Wrocław, Poland.  

E-mail: leszuk@vp.pl    

THE DIRECTNESS IN PROCESSES OF EVOLUTION

ABSTRACT

One of the fundamental problems in evolutionary sciences is the direction of evolution at different levels of matter organization. According to traditional teleological interpretations, the evolving systems should develop toward a final state—a goal. However, in most cases such a goal is not determinable—scientists do not know it. However, they can reveal a general tendency or a series of changes in time: a teleonomy or a directness based mainly upon an internal pattern of the evolving system although modified also by external influences. Teleonomical processes are responsible for all evolutionary processes including transitions from one level of organization to another.

Keywords: evolution, directness, goal directness, teleonomy, levels of matter organization. 

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Dariusz A. Szkutnik  

currently an independent researcher.   

SEARCHING FOR DYNAMICAL ORGANIC DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

ABSTRACT

Author’s aim is to highlight problems related to the course of regulatory processes in the structures of the living organism. In this research area the question arises what is the task of causal factors and mechanisms governing regeneration processes, including building new parts of the body. Despite the vast knowledge already gained in this field, the way to restore the functional regeneration of some structures of the organism is still to be discovered.

Keywords: regeneration, development, cause, factors.

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Alicja Kubica  

Pedagogical University of Krakow, ul. Podchorążych 2, 30-084 Cracow, Poland.  

E-mail: alicewanderer@gmail.com     

TYTAN VERSUS ENCELADUS — ON THE MULTITUDE OF THEORIES OF BIOGENESIS AND ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL AWARENESS OF SCIENTISTS

ABSTRACT

The text was created on the basis of interviews with Caltech scholars (Pasadena, USA) in 2018. The talks concerned various contemporary theories of biogenesis and the role of their philosophical premises. The researchers also addressed the issue of popularizing science. The worldview is shaped (and established) by popularizing publications. They also answered the questions how their personal beliefs influenced on research.

Keywords: theoretical synthesis, biogenesis, popular science.  

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Włodzimierz Ługowski  

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: wlugowsk@fispan.waw.pl    

LIFE AS A NATURAL PROPERTY OF MATTER

ABSTRACT

This work is a contribution to understanding the philosophical dimension of the breakthrough that took place in the 20th century historical natural science as a result of the extrapolation of Darwin’s idea of evolution to the area of inanimate matter and the formulation on this basis of a number of theories of pre-biological chemical evolution. The revealed results are the inaccurate recognition of the philosophical foundations of the broadly understood science of evolution: on the one hand, for scientists-naturalists, and on the other, in a much broader, social dimension of their research.

Keywords: nature of life, pre-biological chemical evolution, biogenesis, Weltanschauung.  

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Stanisław Czerniak  

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: stanislaw.l.czerniak@wp.pl     

RICHARD MÜNCH’S THEORY OF ACADEMIC CAPITALISM. AN ATTEMPT OF RECONSTRUCTION AND A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY

ABSTRACT

The author reviews the main elements of Richard Münch’s academic capitalism theory. By introducing categories like “audit university” or “entrepreneurial university,” the German sociologist critically sets the present academic management model against the earlier, modern-era conception of academic research as an “exchange of gifts.” In the sociological and psychological sense, the latter is a social communication structure rooted in traditional social lore, for instance the potlatch ceremonies celebrated by some North-American Indian tribes which Marcel Mauss described. Münch shows the similarities between that old “gift exchanging” model and the contemporary one with its focus on the psychosocial fundamentals of scientific praxis, and from this gradually derives the academic capitalism conception. His conclusion is the critical claim that science possesses its own, inalienable axiological autonomy and anthropological dimension, which degenerate in result of capitalism’s “colonisation” of science by means of state authority and money (here Münch refers to Jürgen Habermas’s philosophical argumentation). The author also offers many of his own reflections on the problem, which allows Münch’s analyses to be viewed in a somewhat broader context.

Keywords: academic capitalism, audit university, entrepreneurial university, potlach, gift exchanging, prestige, identity of the subject, anthropology of science.  

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Małgorzata Czarnocka  

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: mczarnoc@ifispan.waw.pl  

IDEA OF SCIENCE AND THE PROJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS EXACT SCIENCE—EDMUND HUSSERL

ABSTRACT

I investigate Husserl’s long-term research on revealing/constructing a proper idea of science. For Husserl this idea was of tremendous importance: it had to be the basis of forming a (the) proper philosophy (phenomenology), that is, a philosophy which was to be an exact science, a new and higher form of science. According to Husserl, the idea of science is not a free project of individual researchers, scientific communities, but the very essence of science—changeless, universal, nontransformable, non-culturally and socially loaded, ahistorical, and non-relativized to scientific praxis. It was attempt to determine a new status of philosophy which led Husserl’s to the consideration of a universal idea of science.

Keywords: idea of science, Edmund Husserl, positive sciences, philosophy as an exact science, phenomenology.  

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Tomáš Čanal

Department of Philosophy and Applied Philosophy, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Námestie J. Herdu 2, 917 01 Trnava, Slovakia.

E-mail: tomas.cana73@gmail.com  

KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE AND A RADICAL SCEPTICISM

ABSTRACT

According to Descartes, it is possible to doubt successfully that there is external world, all around us, yet still to have language, in place, without any complication. According to Wittgenstein, to doubt everything about the external world except language means nothing more than to doubt everything about the external world including language. Why? No speaker is more certain about the meaning of his words than about the external things he believes to be unassailable (for example, that he has two hands and two legs). Without this constitutive connection there would be no communication of a definite sense. Wittgenstein suggests that, after the author of the Meditations on First Philosophy adopts the hypothesis of evil deceiver, we are only under the impression that we deal with language (or that we read a text). We instead deal with symptoms of something rather different. The objective of this paper is to critically reassess Wittgenstein’s criticism of the possibility of holding such a radical sceptical position.

Keywords: Cartesian doubt, certainty, Descartes, epistemology, Evil Deceiver, knowledge, scepticism, Wittgenstein.

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Jadwiga Skrzypek-Faluszczak

Faculty of Sociology and History Institute of Sociology, University of Rzeszów, Aleja Rejtana 16c, 35-959 Rzeszów, Poland.

E-mail: jadwiga_f@interia.pl  

SOURCES OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION. IRRATIONALITY OF RATIONALITY AS A SUBSTRATE

ABSTRACT

This work attempts to reconstruct the culture that contributed to the philosophical way of thinking. My goal is to extract two important factors: religion carrying individual experience and the importance of certain ideas which are present in that culture. Sources of philosophical thinking can be found in the structure of polis. Only on its basis could the idea of the wise man and citizen as well as religion-oriented individual experience be raised. Greek polis paves the way for a new style of thinking by creating the conditions for its citizens to follow the ideal, regardless of the position they occupy in society. Sustainability, which should be a feature of a good citizen, is also the essence of society. Highly positioned wisdom as moral reflection tinged with religiosity allows thinking according to the laws of logos. Finally, the experience offered by the mystery cults leads to the transformation of their own existence and the emergence of a way of recognition of reality different than before. Undeniably, all the elements related to structure policies with its ideals contribute to the emergence of a new way of thinking in the form of philosophy. One could say that the philosophical objectivity is preceded by the subjectivity and rationality of its roots dating back to irrationality.

Keywords: irrationalism, divinity, structure polis, philosophy, religious experience.

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Marzenna Cyzman  

Nicholas Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 3, 87-100 Toruń, Poland.

E-mail: mcyzman@umk.pl  

SURPRISING PEREGRINATIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF CONCEPTS. ON THE THOUGHT COLLECTIVE OF LUDWIK FLECK AND THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY OF STANLEY FISH

ABSTRACT

The aim of the article is to compare the thought collective and the interpretive community, two surprisingly similar notions formulated independently by Ludwik Fleck and Stanley Fish. In contemporary discourse, both concepts are used as synonims, while an accurate analysis of the contexts of the use of interesting terms proves that the equivalent of the interpretive community is rather thought collective, as well as the thought style, both of these concepts in the deliberations of Fish are subject to contamination. The exact repartition of the notion of interpretive community seems to be important due to the frequency of its use in works in the field of literary interpretation and cognition. The article also presents more general remarks on the functioning and possible origin of twin terms and their role in scientific cognition.

Keywords: thought collective, thought style, interpretive community, sociology of knowledge, interpretation.  

Göran Sonesson

Division of Cognitive Semiotics, Lund University, Helgonabacken 12, SE-223 62 Lund, Sweden.
E-mail: goran.sonesson@semiotik.lu.se

SEMIOSIS IN HISTORY. THE EMERGENCE OF ALTER-CULTURE

ABSTRACT

Following upon Merlin Donald’s claim that human specificity emerges in history, and not exclusively in evolutionary time, it will be suggested that the diversified means of producing semiosis created by human beings account for the spread of empathy and altruism not only beyond the kin group, but to humankind in general. This amounts to treating other cultures as different from us, but still able to enter into communication with us (as an Alter), as opposed to treating these cultures as being part of nature, and thus only susceptible to being communicated about (as an Alius). Starting out from the theory of bio-cultural evolution defended by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, as well as from the multi-level selection theory of Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, we try to lay bare the way in which semiotic structures play a role for transforming cultural evolution, contrary to biological evolution, into human history. We inquiry into what makes the existence of Alter-culture possible, if, as Sober and Wilson have claimed, armed with game theory, an altruistic society (an Ego-culture in our terms), is only possible in opposition to another group in relation to which group egoism rules (that is, in our terms, an Alius-culture). We will follow Michael Tomasello in arguing for the primacy of games of cooperation, rather than competition, while adding an historical dimension, which serves to explain how such cooperation can be extended beyond the primary group (our Ego-culture). However, we will insist on the importance of multiple semiotic resources for the boot-strapping of empathy and altruism, as well as on the genesis of this process in cultural encounters, as reflected in the spirit of the Enlightenment.

Keywords: Cognition, semiotics, empathy, altruism, bio-cultural coevolution.

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Shekoufeh Mohammadi Shirmahaleh

Instituto de Investigaciones Filológicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Circuito Maestro Mario de la Cueva S/N, Ciudad Universitaria, 04510 Coyoacan, CDMX, Mexico.

E-mail: smohammadi@comunidad.unam.mx  

PEIRCEAN METAPHOR REEXAMINED: CREATION, FUNCTION AND INTERPRETATION

ABSTRACT

The Peircean iconic metaphor takes the concept of metaphor beyond linguistic and literary metaphors and does not even limit it to the “conventional metaphor” of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory. Given Peirce’s short and somewhat ambiguous definition of the metaphorical icon, a closer study of this category of icons is necessary for a better understanding of a concept that surpasses in many respects the earlier definitions of metaphor. It is also necessary to observe metaphors from the perspective of their creator: a perspective that is not usually adopted in other theories of metaphor, since much of the debates consider only the structure of the metaphor and its function with a focus on its interpretation, and do not discuss how the creator of the metaphor reaches or creates a metaphor. The present article aims at filling the mentioned blanks.

Keywords: Charles Sanders Peirce, iconic metaphor, final interpretation, iconicity.  

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Donna West

Modern Languages Department, State University of New York at Cortland, USA Old Main Building, Room 227-B NY 13045, Cortland, USA.

E-mail: westsimon@twcny.rr.com  

SEMIOTIC DETERMINANTS IN EPISODE-BUILDING: BEYOND AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

ABSTRACT

This account examines how episodes are constructed and measured, and how Peirce’s Index informs and even hastens the advancement of this process—from binding spatial features, to the awareness of participant roles and temporal sequencing. It provides semiotic rationale for how episodes develop from static single pictures (dependent on verbatim memory) to events whose frames reflect a deictic and sequential character—superseding the consciousness inherent in autonoesis. Empirical evidence will trace children’s event memory—first iconic and static, and later characteristic of increasingly more complex interpretants which specify directional and logical relations, and memory sources. The signs which promote episodic thought are indexical in nature, given their largely relational character. They incorporate deictic projections of the self in diverse orientations, entering into different participant slots inherent to the event. Notice of the latter entails the influence of index to apprehend the spatial, participatory, and temporal directionality within and across event frames. This progression requires a rudimentary consciousness of aspectual features (telicity, dynamicity), as well as an appreciation for the events’ purposes/goals. Anticipating how, where, and when events conclude is critical to realizing the event’s purpose/goal, since, according to Bauer 2006: 384, it constitutes the basis upon which episodes are constructed.

Keywords: Episode-building, episodic memory, indexical signs, autonoetic consciousness.  

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Jens Allwood, Elisabeth Ahlsén Jens Allwood

SCCIIL Interdisciplinary Center, Department of Applied IT, University of Gothenburg, Forskningsgången 6, Hus Patricia, Lindholmen, 412 96 Göteborg, Sweden.

E-mail: jens.allwood@ait.gu.se

E-mail: elisabeth.ahlsen@gu.se  

DIMENSIONS OF CONTEXT. CLASSIFYING APPROACHES TO THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNICATION

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the concept of context with a special focus on the context of communication. We suggest two ways of classifying approaches to the context of communication: (i) classifying approaches based on a number of relevant dimensions for analyzing context in social activities, (ii) classifying approaches, based on the dimensions of Peirce’s semiotics. We also discuss the use of collected corpora of language, especially multimodal corpora of spoken interaction, as an aid in studying context. Finally, building on the two ways of classifying approaches to the context of communication, we present our own proposal for how to analyze the main relevant contextual dimensions influencing human interaction and communication

Keywords: Context, approaches to context, dimensions of context, syntactic context, semantic context, pragmatic context, semiotics, representamen, object, interpretant, relevant contexts. 

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Paul A. Wilson, Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk

Paul A. Wilson — University of Łódz Institute of English Studies Department of English Language and Applied Linguistics, Pomorska 171/173, 90-236 Łódź, Poland.

E-mail: paul.wilson@uni.lodz.pl

Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk — State University of Applied Sciences in Konin, Department of Research in Language, Literature, and Translation, Przyjaźni 1, 62-510 Konin.

E-mail: blt@konin.edu.pl  

COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND CONCEPTUAL CLUSTERS OF EMOTION TERMS

ABSTRACT

The major underlying principle of the present paper is that, in opposition to the viewpoint of emotions as discrete entities, emotions are represented as clusters in conceptual space. The graded structure and fuzzy boundaries inherent in the prototype-periphery nature of these clusters dictate that the meaning of a specific emotion is governed by both inter- and intra-cluster relationships and their interactions. In addition to these relationships and interactions the paper examines both external and internal affects to compare and contrast the FEAR, COMPASSION, LOVE/JOY, and PRIDE clusters in British English and Polish. The three specific methods employed to analyze these are the GRID instrument, an online emotions sorting task, and a corpus-based cognitive linguistic methodology.

Keywords: emotions, conceptual clusters, British English, Polish, fear, compassion, love/joy, pride, GRID, online emotions sorting task, corpus methodology. 

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Elżbieta Magdalena Wąsik

Adam Mickiewicz University, Faculty of English, Department of Older Germanic Languages, Collegium Heliodori Święcicki, ul. Grunwaldzka 6, 60-780 Poznań, Poland.

Email: wasik@wa.amu.edu.pl  

EXPOSING THE DIALOGICAL NATURE OF THE LINGUISTIC SELF IN INTERPERSONAL AND INTERSUBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE PURPOSES OF LANGUAGE-AND-CONSCIOUSNESS-RELATED COMMUNICATION STUDIES

ABSTRACT

This paper aims at elaborating the concept of linguistic self with regard to its twofold existence modes, namely as a physical person and as a mental subject, being shaped by external and internal dialogs in interpersonal and intersubjective communication. These dialogical encounters, constantly changing the reality of everyday life, are based, on the one hand, on the observable multitextuality of narratives, and on the other, on the multi-voicedness of opinions. As such, it lays emphasis on the need for a holistic approach to human beings as a psychosomatic unity, taking part in cognition with their minds and bodies, and developing itself both in-and-with the physical and logical domains of their surrounding ecosystems. In view of the private and public character of the self, the author postulates to consider in future studies the achievements of personal and social constructivism.

Keywords: cognition, consciousness, intersubjectivity, language, the dialogical self.  

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Zdzisław Wąsik

Philological School of Higher Education in Wrocław, Department of Linguistic Semiotics and Communicology, ul. Sienkiewicza 32, 50-335 Wrocław.

E-mail: zdzis.wasik@gmail.com  

EPISTEMOLOGY AS A SEMIOTIC CARTOGRAPHY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITION

ABSTRACT

The subject matter of this article constitutes the semiotic mapping of human of knowledge which results from cognition. Departing from the presentation of human subjects as world-model-builders, it places epistemology among the sciences of science and the sciences of man. As such the understanding of epistemology is referred either to a static state of knowledge or to a dynamic acquisition of knowledge by cognizing subjects. The point of arrival, in the conclusive part of a this article, constitutes the substantiation of the two understandings of epistemology, specified, firstly, as a set of investigative perspectives, which the subject of science has at his/her disposal as a knower on the metascientific level, or, secondly, as a psychophysiological endowment of a cognizing subject who possesses the ability of learning and/or knowing a certain kind of information about cognized reality.

Keywords: cartography of ideas, epistemology, knowledge, cognition, semiotics.    

Ignacy S. Fiut

AGH University of Science and Technology, al. Adama Mickiewicza 30, 30–059 Cracow, Poland.

E-mail: isf1949@o2.pl; isfiut@agh.edu.pl  

IS THE “FOURTH WORLD” POSSIBLE IN KARL R. POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY MODEL?

ABSTRACT

The work analyses the concept of three worlds formulated by Karl R. Popper. His arguments make it possible to distinguish in this field of research the fourth world— that of the development and application of human knowledge. The criteria of Popper’s division are accepted and some doubts concerning his conception are dispelled by the arguments of researchers dealing with the evolution and development of traditional, electronic and Internet media. Those arguments point the need of the concept of fourth world. The author discusses the views of technological determinants in communication authored by M. McLuhan, D. De Kerckhove, P. Levinson, H. Jenkins and J. Pleszczyński who provide reasonable arguments for this new classification. The Popper’s model of three worlds is thus enriched by the fourth world—the world created by users of old and new media, the internet, and multimedia in communication. It is a real world, rooted in the three other worlds.

Keywords: Karl R. Popper’s three words, fourth world, new media of communication, M. McLuhan, D. De Kerckhove, P. Levinson, H. Jenkins and J. Pleszczyński.  

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Stanisław Czerniak

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail : stanislaw.l.czerniak@wp.pl  

JÜRGEN MITTELSTRASS: THE HUMANITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITY OF SCIENCE CONCEPTION

ABSTRACT

The author recounts the main threads of Jürgen Mittelstrass’s philosophy of the humanities. In it, the German philosopher starts out with the critique of J. Ritter’s and O. Maquard’s so-called functionalistic and dualistic conception of the human sciences, stating preference for methodological monism, which sees all sciences united by the universal rules of rationality. Mittelstrass seeks this unity both in the trans-disciplinary trends in contemporary science, as well as in certain epistemological similarities and similarities in research praxis between scientific disciplines. The author also points to Mittelstrass’s Kantian inspirations, and his clever adaptation of the “power of judgement” concept for the purposes of his own argumentation. In a final resume, he passes a generally positive opinion about the discussed conception with some critical comments.

Keywords: The humanities/the human sciences, rationality, the compensatory functions of the humanities, power of judgement, trans-disciplinary, research praxis.  

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Małgorzata Czarnocka

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: mczarnoc@ifispan.waw.pl  

HOW IS SCIENCE UNIVERSAL?

ABSTRACT

I examine the problem of universalities of science and the thesis on the antiuniversality of science commonly postulated in socialized conceptions of science. In the paper epistemic universality, ethical-axiological and global cultural-social universality, and in the latter—global universality of the basic level are distinguished. It is investigated why in epistemology science is necessarily viewed as universal in its basic aspects. It is shown that universality is a necessary effect of validity and autonomy of science. It is also demonstrated that multiculturalism improperly treats science as necessarily anti-universalistic. I propose the position of global universalism of the basic level which claims that science emerges from the cultural basis, common for all the cultures. This universalism adopts multiculturalism (cultural pluralism) on higher levels of culture. I also consider how epistemic and global universality—features of science—become its values, and what are their significance for the human world.

Keywords: epistemology, socialized conceptions of science, the universality of science, epistemic universality, global social-cultural universality, universality as a value.   

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Marek Suwara

Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland.

E-mail: marek marek.suwara@uj.edu.pl  

ANALOGIES REFERRING TO INFORMATION SCIENCE AND BIOLOGY IN EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE

ABSTRACT

The level of adequacy of an analogy determines its effectiveness in scientific explanation. This thesis is examined in the context of analogies to information science and biology used in the concept of cultural meme, which is supposed to be substantial in explaining science or culture in the terms of evolution. It is shown that the choice of the cultural equivalent of biological specimen is crucial to interpreting the evolution of culture as that of the Lamarckian or Darwinian type.

Keywords: evolution, culture, analogy, meme.  

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Jagna Brudzińska

Husserl-Archiv der Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, D-50923 Köln, Niemcy.

E-mail: jbrudzinska@gmail.com  

PHENOMENOLOGY AS A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE AND SOME CHALLENGES OF THE TODAY HUMANITIES—NEW PERSPECTIVES IN HUMAN STUDIES

ABSTRACT

Phenomenology is a philosophical project with vast potential, mainly methodological one, which has been not exploited in full until now. It is not limited to 20thcentury hermeneutics based on Heidegger’s views, nor to analytically founded contemporary investigations on language. Today this potential is revealed when the humanities and social studies face new challenges requiring new interpretations of human experience. Here transcendental phenomenology—as a theory of experience from the living perspective based on the intentional-genetic method—offers new research possibilities.

Keywords: transcendental phenomenology, intentional experience, experiential living perspective, motivation, developmental process.  

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Rafał Michalski

Institute of Philosophy, Nicholas Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 1 a, 87-100 Toruń, Poland.

E-mail: metasis@umk.pl  

WAS ARNOLD GEHLEN A NATURALISTIC REDUCTIONIST?

ABSTRACT

The article takes up a polemic with an accusation of naturalist reductionism, which allegedly constitutes the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen. In the first section of the article I will analyze the legitimacy of the charge of reductionism in the context of Gehlen’s considerations on human nature, in turn the subjcekt of the second part will be the concept of nature as an objective world, while the third and fourth sections will deal with issues concerning morality (3) and culture and human consciousness (4) in view of the allegation of the naturalism of his anthropological project. The author argues that Gehlen’s anthropology is aimed at integrating the results of the biological and social sciences, but he derives philosophical implications from them on such a level of generality that they go beyond the competence of specific sciences. Their findings acquire a universal meaning in his concept within the framework of a system of philosophical categories describing man as a whole project of nature. Gehlen rejects all attempts to create a general human theory on the basis of comparative studies that derive the property of the human condition from the animal world. Gehlen’s anthropobiology resigns from the concept of man’s nature in the biological sense, i.e. as a set of evolutionarily determined morphological, physiological and behavioral features, he also abandons the objectiveist concept of “external nature” as an ontical area independent of cultural mediation. Language, consciousness and culture are the result of processes compensating for biological deficits, and at the same time they represent the area of competence and values that are autonomous and autotelic, and therefore completely independent of biological conditions.

Keywords: Arnold Gehlen, naturalistic reductionism, philosophical anthropology, culture, language, morality, institutions.    

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Marcin Urbaniak

Pedagogical University of Krakow , Podchorążych 2, 30-084 Cracow, Poland.

E-mail: murbaniak78@gmail.com  

A VIEW ON HUMAN HERMENEUTIC CAPABILITIES FROM THE ZOOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT

The article attempts to present the philosophical idea of origin of human capability to interpret and understand meanings. I am inspired by the results of contemporary cognitive and natural sciences as well as psychology. In view of those sciences one can defy hermeneutical concepts, which are embedded in the modern anthropocentric tradition. I would like to explain the ontological status of so-called hermeneutical skills in a naturalized form that does not avoid the continuous gradation of subject’s structures or abilities without falling into trivial reductionism. I demonstrate that the comprehensive formation of understanding processes is reserved for particular groups of human beings. However, it can be justified that different animal species and direct human ancestors are equipped with some elements of hermeneutical skills. These skills are a ground of the notion of Dasein. This paper begins my reflection on the natural history of human understanding and on polemics with anthropocentric philosophical hermeneutics. The basic aim of this work is to closely consider the hypothesis which states that the fundamental aspect of human existence (primordial modes) such as comprehension, attuning towards meanings or being-in-the-world can be grasped as natural adaptations of human and non-human organisms.

Keywords: hermeneutics, understanding, interpretation, evolution, sense, symbol.  

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Jarosław Mrozek

Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Jana Bażyńskiego 8, 80-309 Gdansk, Poland.

E-mail: filjam@ug.edu.pl   

IS THERE A CHANGE IN THE CRITERIA OF BEING A SCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS?

ABSTRACT

The contemporary physical and cosmological theories confront philosophers and methodologists with a problem of scientific character of the considered ideas. It is mainly connected with the issue of their empirical testing. We know that many conceptions of contemporary physics, such as the conceptions of superstrings or of multiverse, have not been confirmed by even a single observation or experiment. In this situation there appear attempts to “weaken” methodological requirements imposed on theories to consider them as scientific after all. The challenge that physicists, philosophers and methodologists face is to attempt to define a feasible, possible to perform, non-empirical verification procedure in the case when these theories postulate the existence of basically non-observable areas of reality.

Keywords: testability; falsifiability; demarcation criteria; Popper; Bayesian methods; non-empirical theory confirmation.  

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Adam Krawiec, Marek Szydłowski, Paweł Tambor

Adam Krawiec  

Institute of Economics, Finance and Management of the Jagiellonian University, ul. Łojasiewicza 4, 30–348 Kraków.

E-mail: adam.krawiec@uj.edu.pl

Marek Szydłowski  

Astronomical Observatory of the Jagiellonian University, ul. Orla 171, 30–244 Cracow, Poland.

E-mail: marek.szydlowski@uj.edu.pl

Paweł Tambor  

John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: pawel.tambor@kul.lublin.pl  

THE ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL SPECIFICITY OF COSMOLOGY AS A SCIENCE ON THE UNIVERSE

ABSTRACT

We discuss the specificity of modern cosmology understood as the physics of the Universe. We can treat cosmology as specific because of its object, i.e. the physical Universe is specific, as well as the ways of acquiring the knowledge about the Universe are specific. We argue that the specific and, in some sense, unique methodological nature of modern cosmology compared to physics is not controversial, as it is claimed among others by Helge Kragh. In our view this specificity is natural of cosmology itself and has its foundations in: 1) the asymmetry of prediction (which favors retrognosis), 2) the temporal nature of observations applied in cosmological investigations, 3) the horizon problem and the relevance of initial conditions for cosmological evolution.

Keywords: modern cosmology, philosophy of science, methodological specificity of cosmology, the evolution of the Universe.   

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Marek Gurba

Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Cracow, Poland.

E-mail: marek.gurba@doctoral.uj.edu.pl  

ON NICHOLAS RESCHER’S ORIENTATIONAL PLURALISM IN METAPHILOSOPHY

ABSTRACT

The article discusses Nicholas Rescher’s metaphilosophical view of orientational pluralism. In his essay Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy Rescher explains a substantial difference between philosophy and science—namely, that philosophers—differently than scientists— continuously propose and undermine various solutions to the same old problems. In philosophy it is difficult to find any consensus or convergence of theories. According to Rescher, this pluralism of theoretical positions is caused by holding by philosophers different sets and hierarchies of cognitive values, i.e. methodological orientations. These orientations are chosen in virtue of some practical postulates, they are of axiological, normative, but not strictly theoretical character. Different methodological orientations yield different evaluations of philosophical theses and arguments. This article shows that Rescher’s account does not determine clearly acceptable cognitive values. If there are no clear criteria of evaluation of methodological orientations, then the described view seems to be identical to relativism adopting the everything goes rule. In addition, accepting orientational pluralism it is hard to avoid the conclusion that discussions between various philosophical schools are futile or can be reduced to non-rational persuasion.

Keywords: metaphilosophy, Nicholas Rescher, relativism, methodology of philosophy, orientational pluralism.  

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Karolina Owczarek

Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warsaw, Poland.

E-mail: karolina.m.owczarek@gmail.com  

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND ON THE BASIS OF STANISŁAW LEM’S DIALOGUES

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to present Lem’s philosophy of mind. The author bases it on Dialogues — the first Lem’s philosophical essays published in 1957. It is emphasized that at that time Lem was influenced by cybernetics. I present connections between cybernetics and Lem’s theory. He considered such issues as: consciousness, machine consciousness, personal identity. What is more, he investigated if immortality was available to human. I reconstruct his conception of mind and its anthropological and ontological consequences.

Keywords: Lem, philosophy of mind, mind uploading, cybernetics, personal identity, consciousness.  

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Andrzej Bronk, Monika Walczak

Andrzej Bronk  

John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Aleje Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: bronk@kul.lublin.pl

Monika Walczak

John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Aleje Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.

E-mail: aktor@kul.pl  

STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI’S METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS

ABSTRACT

Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. His all academic carrier was pursuing at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL). The main interests of Kamiński was the history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. He himself saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics. He gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology). He investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, the modern history of the theory of definition, theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, deductive method, the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of Kamiński’s philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was a maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge, distinguished and investigated material and formal parts of knowledge. He also distinguished—besides commonsense knowledge—the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge, nonreducible each to other. At the top he set sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. Kamiński derived his understanding of science from contemporary as well as classical philosophy. He determined the nature of science from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science was for him a philosophical question, presupposing an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world, subjective states of man and products of his mind and language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Kamiński assumes here pluralism: different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. He also accepts an antinaturalistic position in the humanities which he regards as methodologically autonomous in regard to natural sciences. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life three books have been published: Georgonne’a teoria definicji [Georgonne’s Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and (together with M. A. Krąpiec) Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd – Religia – Teologia [Worldview – Religion – Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998.

Keywords: definition of science, classification of sciences, ethics of science, humanities and natural sciences, methodology, philosophy, philosophy of science, rationality of science, science, scientific method, Stanisław Kamiński, theology, theory of science.  

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Józef Dębowski

Institute of Philosophy, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, ul. Obitza 1, 10-725 Olsztyn, Poland.

E-mail: jozef.debowski@uwm.edu.pl  

THE DISPUTE ON THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF PHILOSOPHY. ON ZDZISŁAW CACKOWSKI’S DISCUSSION WITH PHENEMENOLOGY

ABSTRACT

In the article I analytically reconstruct Zdzisław Cackowski’s basic ways of the understanding character of philosophy and science. I emphasize that according to Cackowski philosophy is a science (a nomothetic one) but simultaneously it is the most general science. Philosophy, like other sciences, satisfies conditions and criteria of being science. Besides its cognitive function, philosophy, like other sciences, plays practical functions; especially it is a basis of worldviews and ideologies. According to Cackowski, the specific character of philosophy arises from its universalistic aspirations and consists in a very high level of generality of discovered principles; those principles refer to the objective reality and knowledge on it. The specificity of philosophy also consists in—according to Cackowski—revealing the nature of qualitative jumps between basic segments of the real world, e.g. between quantum objects and macroscopic ones, between non-organic and organic nature; between neuronal processes and mind process etc. However, tending to not break the link between philosophy and reality, Cackowski grounds philosophical synthesis in scientific discoveries, results, and scientific praxis. Cackowski’s way of understanding of philosophy is, on the one hand, close to positivistic, scientific and Marxist concepts of philosophy, and on the other hand, it is opposite to the phenomenological concept of philosophy. Cackowski’s reservations and objections to the phenomenological project of philosophical investigations appear continuously in his works (they change only slightly in the course of time), and they refer to: (1) the scope and the meaning of the autonomy of sciences, (2) the rule of assumptionless standpoint (regardless of the level of its radicalism), (3) Husserl’s “rule of the all rules” as a basic methodological principle, (4) the phenomenological concept of direct experience, (5) the possibility and the range of eidetic knowledge, (6) the idea of transcendentalism and the concept of pure consciousness, (7) the essential fundamental position, motivated by Descartes’s ideas and irrational longing to discover the metaphysical and epistemological absolute.

Keywords: philosophy, science, phenomenology, Marxist philosophy, epistemology, reality, action, acquisition, knowledge, empiricism, inductionism, positivism, scientism, praxism, assumptionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit, Vorurteilslosigkeit), the rule of assumptionlessness (das Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit), transcendentalism, eidetism, direct experience.  

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Anna Michalska

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland.

E-mail: michalskanna@gmail.com  

STEFAN AMSTERDAMSKI’S CONCEPTION OF IDEAL OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT OF SCIENCE

ABSTRACT

The conception of ideals of science was Stefan Amsterdamski’s contribution to the dispute about scientific rationality. In assuming that scientific method is not an ahistorical phenomenon, and comes with rather strong normative pressupositions, Amsterdamski sides with Thomas Kuhn in his debate with Karl Popper and the latter’s followers and supporters. Essentially, however, Amsterdamski is a Popperian; he is intent on enlarging the scope of critical analysis by applying it to what he calls the modern ideal of science. His works, especially the monograph Pomiędzy historią a metodą [Between History and Method] are an attempt to safeguard the status of philosophy of science a normative instance with respect to ideals of science. In the paper I offer a reconstruction of Amsterdamski’s conception as well as scrutinize the relationship between his expressed philosophic goals and methods he employed in order to attain these goals. I indicate what I find most problematic in the concept of ideal of science and suggest an alternative view on the problems as raised by Amsterdamski. I argue that Amsterdamski’s work warrants an attempt at the formulation of a new conception of subject of science which would provide guidelines for a proper critique of modern science.

Keywords: ideals of science, scientific rationality, history of science, Stefan Amsterdamski, subject of science.  

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Mariola Kuszyk-Bytniewska

Institute of Philosophy, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, Poland.

E-mail: mkuszyk@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl  

FLORIAN ZNANIECKI ON SCIENCE. THE ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT

I include Florian Znaniecki’s understanding of cultural sciences into a wider philosophical project which I call social onto-epistemology. The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct Znaniecki’s philosophy as a research effort to set the foundation of social sciences; the “foundation” is meant here as it is meant in 19th philosophical fundamentalism, i.e. as the search for the basis of legitimisation of social sciences. Despite of the non-originality of this aim, the measures and modes of its application in Znaniecki’s approach were fruitful. The onto-epistemological approach avoids Cartesian and Kantian dualisms and, pre-eminently, the monosubjective understanding of the cognitive subject. The graduation of realness with regard to the object of social science, objectivity as belonging to many systems of cultural objects are main invention on this path. The main onto-epistemological premise of Znaniecki’s strategy is as follows: Human knowledge is deeply rooted in human social existence, and the human mode of existence, in turn, contains necessarily and essentially an epistemic component.

Keywords: Znaniecki, onto-epistemology, science, social sciences.  

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Grzegorz Pyszczek

The Maria Grzegorzewska Academy of Special Education, Szczęśliwicka 40, 02-353 Warszawa, Poland.

E-mail: gpyszczek@poczta.onet.pl  

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE SAGE. ON FLORIAN ZNANIECKI’S CONCEPTION

ABSTRACT

The article concerns Florian Znaniecki’s problem of social role of the sage. The first part of the article presents the concept of social role of the sage in the context of other social roles of scholars. In the second part, Znaniecki’s view is confronted with the contemporary social and scientific realities.

Keywords: Florian Znaniecki, sage, wisdom, social role of the man of knowledge.   

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Marta Błaszczyńska

Graduate School for Social Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland.

E-mail: marta.blaszczynska@hotmail.co.uk  

ARNOLD GEHLEN’S MAN, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOME QUESTIONS ASKED DBY CONTEMPORARY READERS

ABSTRACT

I examine the key elements of Arnold Gehlen’s concept of human being as it is presented in his book Man, His Nature and Place in the World. I analyze his attempt to interpret the human as a whole and to define humanity as a species which is “lacking” and whose acts must compensate for its “primitive” traits. I briefly present selected questions and difficulties that might be posed by the contemporary reader upon learning about Gehlen’s understanding of the human being and his vision of philosophical anthropology, its aims and methodology.

Keywords: Arnold Gehlen, philosophical anthropology, German philosophy, human nature.  

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Grzegorz Smoliński

Institute of Sociology, University of Wroclaw, Koszarowa 3, 52–007 Wrocław, Poland.

E-mail: grzegorz.smolinski@uwr.edu.pl  

SCIENCE AND ITS CRITIQUE: THE CONTEXT OF ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY

ABSTRACT

The article starts with the considerations presented by Małgorzata Czarnocka in her paper O krytyce nauki [On a Critique of Science] (Czarnocka 2017) in order to consider the critical potential of dualism—the ideal of science—practice of science. These considerations are compared with the Actor-Network Theory, which, on the one hand, in its theses about science approaches to the image criticized by Czarnocka, but, on the other hand, retains a similar critical potential. This is despite the fact that ANT this theory programmatically rejects the duality ideal–praxis. Presented considerations focus on designating common points and differences between the dualistic and non-dualistic approaches in the context of Czarnocka’s article.

Keywords: dualism, non-dualism, criticism of science, Latour, Actor-Network Theory.